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JUDGMENT AND REASONING IN ADOLESCENT
DECISIONMAKING
ELIZABETH S. ScoTr*
SEW people believe that five year olds and fifteen year olds
think, act or make decisions in the same way. The question is
whether and how the law should respond to developmental differ-
ences.' Traditionally, childhood and adulthood have been two
dichotomous legal categories, demarcated by the age of majority.
This conception has been contested in recent years, as has the
premise that all minors are incompetent to make decisions and
function as legal actors. Fueled by the controversy over adoles-
cent access to abortion, an advocacy movement has emerged that
challenges the authority of parents and the state over the lives of
young people. For some advocates, the claims of adolescents to
self-determination are a natural extension of the liberal ideology
that forcefully emerged in the civil rights movement of the
1960s.2
Although this "children's rights" movement is driven by poli-
tics and ideology, the case for changing the legal status of minors
rests in large part on empirical grounds; indeed, many leading
proponents are psychologists.3 From the start, critics of tradi-
* University Professor, University of Virginia. For their helpful comments
on an earlier draft, I thankJoe Allen, Richard Bonnie, Bill Gardner, Tom Grisso,
John Jeffries, John Monahan, Dick Reppucci, Bob Scott, Bill Stuntz and partici-
pants in a faculty workshop at the University of Virginia School of Law. Pat
Ladnier provided excellent research assistance.
1. For a recent discussion of this "puzzle" and of other aspects of children's
rights, see John Coons et al., Puzzling over Children's Rights, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REV.
307.
2. RICHARD FARSON, BIRTHRIGHTS 2 (1974). According to Farson, the civil
rights movement led Americans to see "the necessity for children's liberation."
Id.; cf. Patricia M. Wald, Making Sense Out of the Rights of Youth, 4 HuM. RIGHTS 13,
15 (1974) ("The child's subjugated status was rooted in the same benevolent
despotism that kings, husbands, and slave masters claimed as their moral
right.").
3. Psychologists have been actively involved in the advocacy movement,
promoting adolescent rights in academic, political and judicial arenas. See gener-
ally GARY B. MELTON, CHILD ADVOCACY: PSYCHOLOGICAL ISSUES AND INTERVEN-
TION (1983) (providing overview of advocacy in different forums on behalf of
children); Gary B. Melton, Toward "Personhood"for Adolescents: Autonomy and Pri-
vacy as Values in Public Policy, 38 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 99 (1983) (advocating treat-
ment of adolescents as autonomous persons). The American Psychological
Association (APA), for example, has submitted amicus briefs to the Supreme
Court on several occasions in support of the right of pregnant teenagers to make
(1607)
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tional policies have turned to child development theory and re-
search to support arguments that children, particularly
adolescents, should be given greater legal autonomy. 4 Paternalis-
tic legal treatment is based on the presumption that minors, due
to their immaturity, are incompetent to make their own choices.
This premise, advocates argue, has now been discredited by social
science research and theory that demonstrate that by age fourteen
adolescents are indistinguishable from adults in their decision-
making competence. 5 This evidence, it is said, seriously under-
mines the justification for different legal treatment.
The empirical challenge to paternalism raised by advocates
of adolescent rights is important. If legal restrictions of minors
are grounded in erroneous intuitions about their differences from
adults, then the errors should be exposed and the legal policies
reconsidered. My reservations are not about the wisdom of this
project, but about the approach that is used and the conclusions
that are drawn. To be sure, any analysis of how the decisional
abortion decisions. See Brief for Amicus Curiae, American Psychological Associ-
ation, National Association of Social Workers, Inc., and American Jewish Com-
mittee in support of petitioners/cross respondents, Ohio v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990) (Nos. 88-1125, 88-1309), and in sup-
port of appellees, Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990) (No. 88-805)
[hereinafter APA Hodgson brief] (addressing constitutionality of Ohio and Min-
nesota parental notification of abortion statutes, respectively) Brief for Amicus
Curiae, American Psychological Association, in support of appellees, Zbaraz v.
Hartigan, 484 U.S. 171 (1987) (No. 85-673) [hereinafter APA Zbaraz brief] (ad-
dressing constitutionality of regulating abortions of unemancipated minors and
incompetents); Brief for Amicus Curiae, American Psychological Association in
support of appellees, Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gy-
necologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (No. 84-495) [hereinafter APA Thornburgh
brief] (challenging constitutionality of Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act).
4. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 245 n.3 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting in part) (citing psychologists Jean Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg in
arguing that Amish children should have voice in decision of whether they
should remain in school). Arlene Skolnick offered an early challenge based on
child development research to the empirical assumptions underlying traditional
policies. Arlene Skolnick, The Limits of Childhood. Conceptions of Child Development
and Social Context, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1975, at 38, 43.
5. The argument draws on Piaget's stage theory of cognitive development,
on Kohlberg's theory of moral development and on a small group of empirical
studies that show adolescents and adults to be similar in their ability to engage
in a rational decisionmaking process. For a discussion of the scientific support
for adolescent competence, see infra notes 72-90 and accompanying text. For an
early exposition of the argument and review of the developmental research rele-
vant to adolescent competency, see Thomas Grisso & Linda Vierling, Minors'
Consent to Treatment: A Developmental Perspective, 9 PROF. PSYCHOL. 412 (1978). For
a recent summary of this research, see Josephine Gittler et al., Adolescent
Health Care Decisionmaking: The Law and Public Policy (June 1990) (unpub-
lished manuscript, prepared for Carnegie Council on Adolescent Development,
Washington, D.C.).
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and functional abilities of minors affect or should affect their legal
status is correctly based on a comparison of the decisionmaking
of children of different ages with that of adults. However, two
important weaknesses limit the effectiveness of the empirical ar-
guments. First, advocates reach too far in their empirical claims,
exaggerating the robustness of evidence that no differences dis-
tinguish adults and adolescents in their capacity for rational deci-
sionmaking. 6 Second, the advocates' approach is theoretically
flawed, conceiving too narrowly the scope of abilities that are rel-
evant to policymakers in deciding whether adolescents should be
distinguished from adults.
Reformers arguing for greater adolescent self-determination
have focused on medical decisionmaking, a focus that has been
sharpened by the intense interest in adolescent abortion. Thus,
informed consent doctrine has shaped the discourse and pro-
vided the standard for comparing the capabilities of minors with
those of adults. This framework for assessing competence fo-
cuses on two aspects of cognitive functioning: the capacity for un-
derstanding and the capacity for reasoning. 7 The doctrine, and
thus the framework, exclude inquiry into aspects of decisionmak-
ing that have to do with the quality of judgment; an inclination to
make "poor" choices does not signify incompetence under in-
formed consent tests.8 The focus on cognitive processes and the
exclusion of outcome-based measures of competence are
grounded in a policy goal of protecting adults making medical
decisions from excessive state interference.
In contrast, the state's relationship to children is character-
ized by deep and pervasive paternalism.9 This paternalistic norm
rests not only on skepticism about the capacity of minors to en-
gage in rational decisionmaking, but also on the belief that the
quality of youthful decisions is affected by the immaturity of their
6. See William Gardner et al., Asserting Scientific Authority: Cognitive Develop-
ment and Adolescent Legal Rights, 44 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 895, 895 (1989) (detailing
deficiencies in advocates' claim that social science research supports conclusion
that adolescent decisionmaking competence is similar to that of adults).
7. Reasoning, according to informed consent doctrine, connotes decision-
making through a rational process.
8. Good judgment is measured in part by the reasonableness of outcomes.
Decisions that promote life, health and welfare are often described as reflecting
good judgment.
9. It is of course true that, in many contexts, legal policy toward adults is
also paternalistic. Autonomy is often restricted to reduce social cost. Indeed,
informed consent standards also have a utilitarian rationale. For a discussion of
the customary balancing of autonomy with social costs, see infra notes 118-20
and accompanying text.
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judgment. The narrow conception of adolescent competence im-
plicit in the informed consent framework is of limited usefulness,
therefore, because it does not respond to important concerns un-
derlying paternalistic policies.
A more useful framework for analyzing adolescent decision-
making and comparing the capacity and performance of adoles-
cents with that of adults would focus on outcomes as well as
processes and incorporate judgment as well as reasoning and un-
derstanding. One goal of this article is to delineate how some
developmentally linked traits and responses might influence deci-
sionmaking in important ways that are obscured under the in-
formed consent framework. For example, adolescents and adults
are assumed to differ in their temporal perspective, attitude to-
ward risk, impulsiveness and in the value attached to peer influ-
ence and personal appearance.' 0 Empirical study examining
whether and in what ways these factors help to differentiate be-
tween the decisionmaking of adults and minors is currently
sparse. Additional systematic investigation can surely contribute
to a more comprehensive account of adolescent decisionmaking
capacity.
In Part I of this article, I describe the deeply paternalistic
stance of contemporary legal policy toward minors and argue that
even regulation that respects self-determination fits comfortably
into this framework. This paternalistic framework, however, ulti-
mately rests on the premise that adults and minors are different.
If minors and adults are more alike than we have supposed, then
the justification for a protective stance is weakened. Part II there-
fore examines the current empirical support for a policy of ado-
lescent self-determination. I argue that the recent analysis of
adolescent competence is focused too narrowly, because the dis-
course has centered on informed consent to make medical deci-
sions. To assist in policy development, comparison between
adults and minors should also encompass aspects of decisionmak-
ing involving judgment. In Part III, I examine the concept of
judgment in order to determine how developmentally-linked
traits might affect decisionmaking in different contexts. Drawing
on cognitive theory and research, I suggest some directions for
future research to improve our understanding of how adolescents
function as decisionmakers and legal actors. In Part IV, I analyze
how a richer understanding of adolescent decisionmaking might
10. For a discussion of these differences, see infra notes 126-79 and accom-
panying text.
1610 [Vol. 37: p. 1607
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inform legal policy, and how, in a world of imperfect information,
policy choices are shaped primarily by different normative
perspectives.
I. THE PATERNALISTIC FRAMEWORK
Paternalism permeates the legal treatment of minors. A
strong presumption persists that the important decisions affecting
children's lives will be made by others, either their parents or the
state; that minors are entitled to support and protection by both
their parents and the state; and that they should be less accounta-
ble than adults for both choices and conduct. Although minors
may become legal adults for some discrete purposes before" l and
occasionally after' 2 their eighteenth birthday, this milestone-the
age of majority-is a critically important legal event, a bright line
that separates childhood from adulthood. 13 The bright line has
blurred a bit in recent years, and challenges to the powerless sta-
tus of minors, particularly adolescents, have increased. Argu-
ments for rethinking an approach that treats childhood as a
monolithic legal category are supported by the unassailable evi-
dence that adolescents do not act or think like young children."4
11. At age 16, a minor can obtain a license to operate a motor vehicle in
most states. Minors also can be treated as adults for the purpose of waiving
Miranda rights. See Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979) (finding no
persuasive reasons to adopt different approaches for adults and juveniles when
evaluating waiver of Miranda rights); see also THOMAS GRISSO, JUVENILES' WAIVER
OF RIGHTS: LEGAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL COMPETENCE 209 (1981) ("The major-
ity's decision [in Fare] is a warning that the Supreme Court . . . will not look
favorably on proposals for special due process protections in the interrogation
ofjuveniles."). In addition, minors can be subject to adult criminal prosecution.
See Franklin E. Zimring, The Treatment of Hard Cases in American Juvenile Justice: In
Defense of Discretionary Waiver, 5 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 267, 268
(1991) (advocating maintenance of status quo for determining when juveniles
should be tried as adults).
12. See, e.g., 23 U.S.C. § 158 (1988) (mandating that states prohibit drinking
until age 21 or lose federal highway funds). This federal statute was upheld by
the Supreme Court against a challenge based on the Twenty-first Amendment.
South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987); see also Childers v. Childers, 575 P.2d
201 (Wash. 1978) (en banc) (authorizing child support to assist with financing
college education though child is no longer minor).
13. In most states, upon reaching the age of majority, an individual can
vote, serve on a jury, execute a binding contract, consent to medical treatment
and serve in the armed forces without parental consent. ALAN N. SUSSMAN, THE
RIGHTS OF YOUNG PEOPLE: THE BASIC ACLU GUIDE TO A YOUNG PERSON'S
RIGHTS 24-25, 48-49, 188-89 (1977). In general, parental custody ends at the
age of majority, as does the duty of parental support. Id. at 45, 155-56.
14. For a thoughtful, comprehensive treatment of this issue, see FRANKLIN
E. ZIMRING, THE CHANGING LEGAL WORLD OF ADOLESCENCE (1982). See also Wil-
lard Gaylin, The "Competence" of Children: No Longer All or None, 21 J. AM. ACAD.
CHILD PSYCHIATRY 153 (1982) (challenging fixed age of majority and arguing for
1992] 1611
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Yet, resistance to reformulating the premises of legal policy to-
ward children is formidable.
The paternalistic goal of protecting minors and society from
the costs of immature judgment is an even more powerful con-
straint on initiatives to extend adolescent self-determination than
is usually acknowledged. In this Part, I will demonstrate that poli-
cies that appear to signal an erosion of the paternalistic legal
framework in fact fit quite comfortably within it. Moreover, even
advocates of expanded rights for adolescents are generally instru-
mentalist in their approach to autonomy and are ultimately driven
by paternalistic goals. At the heart of this paternalism is a com-
monly shared intuition that minors have poorer judgment than
adults and that they are more likely than adults to make choices
that are threatening to their health and well-being.
A. The Decline of Paternalism: Revolution or Illusion
1. Signs of Change
Although the legal control that adults have over children's
lives is pervasive, some evidence suggests that courts and legisla-
tures are rethinking the law's protectionist stance. At a constitu-
tional level, the United States Supreme Court in recent years has
reexamined old premises that fixed the positions of the state and
parents as powerful protectors of dependent children. Heralding
this change was the 1967 opinion, In re Gault,15 in which the Court
dealt an almost fatal blow to the paternalistic juvenile court sys-
tem by according to juveniles many of the rights of adult criminal
defendants. 16 Two years later, in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District,17 the Court announced that children are
persons under the Constitution and that their interest in expres-
sing opposition to the Vietnam War was protected under the First
Amendment.' 8 Presaging the approach of later children's rights
"variable competence" standard, depending on age, risk, benefit and nature of
decision).
15. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
16. See id. (giving juveniles many of same procedural protections-notice of
charges, right to counsel, privilege against self-incrimination and right to cross-
examination-as adult criminal defendants because consequences are similar).
Another opinion, Goss v. Lopez, weakened the authority of school authorities
somewhat by affording due process protections to students facing school disci-
plinary proceedings. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581 (1975) (holding that
student must be given notice of charges, explanation of evidence authorities
possess and opportunity to present his side of story).
17. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
18. Id. at 514 (upholding students' rights to wear black armbands to protest
Vietnam War).
1612 [Vol. 37: p. 1607
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advocates, Justice Douglas, in his famous dissent in Wisconsin v.
Yoder, cited psychologists Jean Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg as
authority for the proposition that fourteen-year-old Amish stu-
dents should have a voice in resolving the dispute between their
parents and the state about whether they should remain in
school. 19
On issues of medical consent, courts and legislatures have
also reexamined traditional approaches. Several states have en-
dorsed significant restrictions on parents' authority to admit their
children to psychiatric facilities. 20 Arguments favoring such re-
strictions emphasize adolescents' important liberty interest in
avoiding involuntary hospitalization. In many states, medical
consent statutes give minors authority to consent independently
to treatment for substance abuse, venereal disease, contraception
and psychotherapy. 2' Moreover, in a few states, mature minor
19. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 245 n.3 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing in part). Justice Douglas cited these psychologists in support of his view that
"the moral and intellectual maturity of the 14-year-old approaches that of the
adult." Id. (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
20. Some states go far beyond the limited constitutional restriction of pa-
rental authority announced by the Supreme Court in Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S.
584 (1979). Under Parham, a parental initiative to admit a child to a psychiatric
hospital must be subjected to inquiry by a "neutral factfinder" to determine
whether statutory requirements for admission are met. Id. at 606. However, no
formal proceeding is necessary and a physician can direct the inquiry. Id. at 607.
Some states require a formal judicial proceeding to evaluate the appropriateness
of involuntary admission. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-335 to -348 (Michie
Supp. 1992) (requiring judicial proceeding for involuntary commitment of mi-
nors age 14 and older).
21. Several states allow minors to consent independently to treatment for
substance abuse. See ALA. CODE § 22-8-6 (1990); CAL. CIVIL CODE § 34.10 (West
1982); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12E (West 1983) (if minor is found to
be drug dependent by two physicians); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.343 (West 1989);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.5 (1990); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3719.012 (Anderson
1992); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.675 (1991); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1690.112
(1990); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2969(D)(3) (Michie 1991). In addition, several
statutes provide for independent minor consent for treatment of sexually trans-
mitted diseases. See ALA. CODE § 22-8-6 (1990); CAL. CIVIL CODE § 34.7 (West
1982); IDAHO CODE § 39-3801 (1985); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 111, § 117
(West 1983); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.343 (West 1989); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-
21.5 (1990); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3709.241 (Anderson 1992); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 109.610 (1991); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 10103 (1977); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-
2969(D)(1) (Michie 1991). In the area of medical services regarding forms of
contraception, many states do not require parental consent for minors seeking
these services. See OR. REV. STAT. § 109.640 (1991); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-
2969(D)(2) (Michie 1991). In addition to medical services regarding contracep-
tion, several states do not require parental consent for services to pregnant mi-
nors. See ALA. CODE § 22-8-6 (1990); CAL. CIVIL CODE § 34.5 (West 1982 &
Supp. 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.343 (West 1989); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-
21.5 (1990); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 10103 (1977); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-
2969(D)(2) (Michie 1991). Finally, several states allow independent minor con-
1992] 1613
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legislation extends general medical consent authority to older mi-
nors. 22 These legislative responses indicate a readiness to extend
legal autonomy to minors for some purposes and suggest a will-
ingness to rethink old categories.
This trend might seem to indicate the beginning of a funda-
mental shift in legal policy toward recognition of adolescents' in-
terest in and claim to more autonomy. 23 In part, support for such
a shift by advocates for children's rights reflects a growing skepti-
cism, expressed injustice Douglas' dissent in Yoder, about the ac-
curacy of the premise that minors, or at least adolescents, are
significantly less capable than adults at making important
choices. 24 To the extent that this premise falters, the case for
treating childhood as a separate category is weakened. Following
Justice Douglas' example, supporters of expanding adolescent
legal rights have drawn on developmental theory and research to
challenge the premise of incompetence.2 5
A broader trend in family law has also contributed to a
changing perspective on children and families. Influenced by lib-
eral ideology, the law's conception of the family has been trans-
sent for psychotherapy. See ALA. CODE § 22-8-4 (1990); CAL. CIVIL CODE § 25.9
(West 1982 & Supp. 1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.5 (1990); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 109.675 (1991); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2969(D)(4) (Michie 1991).
22. See ALA. CODE § 22-8-4 (1990) (minor who has attained age of 14 may
consent to medical, dental, health or mental health services); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 109.640 (1991) (minor who has attained age of 15 may consent to hospital
care and medical or surgical care); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-280 (Law. Co-op.
1985) (minor who has attained age of 16 may consent to any health service other
than surgery).
23. Many advocates have announced the importance of the changes. See,
e.g., Gary B. Melton, Legal Reforms Affecting Child and Youth Services: An Introduction,
in Legal Reforms Affecting Child & Youth Services, in 5 CHILD & YOUTH SERVICES 1, 1
(Gary B. Melton ed., 1982) (describing recent "dramatic changes in legal status
of minors").
24. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 245 n.3 (1972) (Douglas, J., dis-
senting in part). Justice Douglas noted that:
[T]here is nothing in this record to indicate that the moral and intellec-
tual judgment demanded of the student by the question in this case is
beyond his capacity. . . . Moreover, there is substantial agreement
among child psychologists and sociologists that the moral and intellec-
tual maturity of the 14-year-old approaches that of the adult.
Id.
25. See, e.g., Gary B. Melton, Developmental Psychology and the Law. The State of
the Art, 22J. FAM. L. 445, 447-51 (1983-1984) (arguing that restriction of minors'
constitutional rights requires empirical evidence of incompetency); Skolnick,
supra note 4, at 75-77 (challenging current social and legal policies regarding
children). More neutral observers have recognized the importance of develop-
mental research to assess the claims of advocates for greater autonomy. See, e.g.,
Robert Mnookin, Children's Rights: Beyond Kiddie Libbers and Child Savers, J.
CLINICAL CHILD PSYCHOL., Fall 1978, at 163, 167.
1614 [Vol. 37: p. 1607
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formed from a tightly organized hierarchical feudal community to
a loosely knit association of autonomous, rights-bearing per-
sons. 26 Some observers would argue that the last stage in this
process, which is now unfolding, involves extending legal per-
sonhood to minors.27 This account of recent legal reform would
suggest that, at least as applied to adolescents, the paternalistic
norm is gradually becoming obsolete.
2. Reinterpreting the Change
The recent developments clearly indicate that the legal de-
marcation separating childhood and adulthood has become
blurred and the categories more complex. Adolescents have at
least become "semi-persons." 28 However, an account of these
events that ends with a prediction of the disintegration of the pa-
ternalistic framework seems to seriously miscalculate the extent
to which a goal of promoting adolescent autonomy has driven re-
cent legal developments. In fact, many of the reforms that ex-
pand adolescent self-determination are wholly consistent with
traditional goals of promoting children's welfare, furthering so-
cial welfare and preserving parental authority.
A reexamination of the Supreme Court's espousal of chil-
dren's rights in this light is exemplary. Tinker v. Des Moines School
District29 and In re Gault,30 the Supreme Court's two landmark
opinions that appear to proclaim a departure from traditional
conceptions of childhood, on reflection seem to have a more or-
thodox cast. Tinker, on its face, describes expansive First Amend-
ment protection of the right of students to political expression in
schools. Subsequent opinions, however, have shown the Court to
26. For a discussion of the hierarchical, feudal character of family law in the
nineteenth century, see MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND
THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1985). For a description of the
transition of the legal conception of the family under the influence of principles
of liberal individualism, see Stephen Morse, Family Law in Transition: From Tradi-
tional Families to Individual Liberty, in CHANGING IMAGES OF THE FAMILY 319 (Vir-
ginia Tufte & Barbara Myerhoff eds., 1979). Morse describes the Supreme
Court's recognition of the autonomy interest of minors in the abortion context
as a natural (although probably limited) extension of the trend. d. at 346.
27. For a radical expression of this position, see FARSON, supra note 2 (pro-
posing elimination of societal discrimination against children to accord chil-
dren's rights equivalent to adults' rights when making decisions affecting
children's lives).
28. See ZIMRING, supra note 14, at 99-101, 123. Zimring describes adoles-
cence as a stage requiring a jurisprudence of "semi-autonomy." Id. at 100.
29. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
30. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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be reluctant to restrict school authority,3' reinforcing the view of
many observers that Tinker has as much to do with the interest of
parents (in inculcating their political values) as with children's
rights.32
Gault provides another example. To be sure, this opinion has
resulted in a sea of change in the procedures applied to juveniles
accused of crimes. Indeed, the most important and extensive re-
forms in legal policy toward children are in the realm of juvenile
justice procedure, and it is here that legal treatment of minors
and adults nearly converges. 33 Yet, a close reading of Gault
reveals that juvenile justice reform was not motivated primarily by
an urge to recognize minors' autonomy interests. Rather, the
Court rejected the paternalistic approach of the traditional juve-
nile court, at least in part, because of its dismal failure to deliver
on its promise of protecting the welfare of children accused of
crimes.3 4 The Gault Court implicitly recognized that the paternal-
31. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (upholding
censorship of school newspaper by school authorities because of curricular na-
ture of activity and school sponsorship); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478
U.S. 675 (1986) (upholding sanction by school authorities of student making
"lewd and indecent" speech in school assembly on grounds that speech under-
mined school's educational mission).
32. See, e.g., Bruce C. Hafen, Children's Liberation and the New Egalitarianism:
Some Reservations About Abandoning Youth to Their "Rights, " 1976 B.Y.U. L. REV.
605, 646. Hafen has commented: "Tinker is not an obstacle to the assertion that
none of the Supreme Court's children's rights cases provide authority for up-
holding the exercise of minors' choice rights-particularly against contrary pa-
rental claims." Id. John Garvey described Tinker as being about "family rights."
John H. Garvey, Child, Parent, State and the Due Process Clause: An Essay on the
Supreme Court's Recent Work, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 769, 785 (1978); see also Robert A.
Burt, Developing Constitutional Rights of in, and for Children, LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Summer 1975, at 118, 122-24 (noting "false psychology" of acknowl-
edging dispute between children and state without recognizing role of parents in
dispute).
33. For example, minors, like adults, have the right to notice of the charges
against them, the right to counsel, the right to cross-examination and the privi-
lege against self-incrimination. Gault, 387 U.S. at 33, 41, 55, 57.
34. Id. at 28-29. Justice Fortas noted the procedural differences between
juvenile and adult courts and described the delinquency adjudication as analo-
gous to a Star Chamber proceeding. Id. at 18. Had Gerald Gault been an adult,
he would have been entitled to substantial protection under the United States
and Arizona constitutions and would have been subject at most to a minimal fine
or two months imprisonment for his offense. Id. at 29. As a juvenile, he was
committed to a correctional facility for an indefinite term of up to six years. Id.
As the Court noted: "There is evidence ... that ... the child receives the worst
of both worlds: that he gets neither the protections accorded to adults nor the
solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for children." Id. at 18
n.23 (citing Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966) (citingJoel F. Han-
dler, The Juvenile Court and the Adversary System: Problems of Function and Form, 1965
Wis. L. REV. 7)). Justice Fortas summarized his point in the now-famous charac-
1616
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ism of the traditional juvenile court was disingenuous in that it
masked the extent to which the social (and judicial) response to
juvenile crime is punitive in nature.35 In fact, young defendants'
welfare is better protected if they are accorded basic procedural
rights. Moreover, the Court in Gault assumed that juveniles fac-
ing criminal charges make decisions with their parents, and thus
saw no disruption of parental authority in the reform.3 6
The policies dealing with medical decisionmaking also fit
within a paternalistic framework. For example, the medical con-
sent statutes described above give minors the authority to consent
independently to treatment in specific contexts in which encour-
aging treatment will benefit the minor (or society) and in which a
requirement of parental consent will likely deter needed treat-
ment.3 7 This is surely the case with psychotherapy, and with
treatment for venereal disease and substance abuse. Moreover,
although the "right" of adolescents to obtain contraceptives has
been linked to notions of reproductive autonomy, access is also
justified as a means to prevent teenage pregnancy with its oner-
ous personal and social costs. 3 8 There is little evidence that
policymakers are moved by concern for minors' autonomy inter-
est in making decisions about sexual activity.3 9 Even access to
abortion, surely the most complex of the medical consent issues,
is supported on paternalistic and general utilitarian grounds as
terization: "Under our Constitution, the condition of being a boy does not jus-
tify a kangaroo court." Id. at 28.
35. The fiction that rehabilitation was the only purpose of the delinquency
intervention was particularly dangerous given the vast discretion of juvenile
court judges. Judges were free to act punitively in the name of rehabilitation.
36. For example, the Court held that due process of law required notice to
the child's parents or guardian, as well as notice to the child himself. Gault, 387
U.S. at 33-34. Notice of the child's right to counsel also must be given to both
child and parents. Id. at 41.
37. For a discussion of medical consent statutes, see supra note 21 and stat-
utes cited therein.
38. See Elizabeth Scott, Adolescents' Reproductive Rights: Abortion, Contraception
and Sterilization, in CHILDREN, MENTAL HEALTH AND THE LAW 125, 137-39 (N.
Dickon Reppucci et al. eds., 1984) (detailing personal and social costs of teenage
pregnancy).
39. Indeed, the Supreme Court, in striking down a New York statute that
prohibited the distribution of contraceptives to minors, recognized that states
might have a legitimate interest in regulating adolescent sexual behavior. See
Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 694 (1977). In no sense do ado-
lescents have a "right" to engage in sexual activity. In fact, some observers have
described adolescent reproductive rights as the right not to reproduce. See
Bruce C. Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship and Sexual Privacy-
Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 MICH. L. REV. 463, 530-31 (1983)
(explaining distinction between decision to engage in sexual activity and to use
contraception).
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much as on the basis of reproductive autonomy.40 No theory of
autonomy, standing alone, explains why some treatments require
parental consent and others do not.
Upon examination, this trend supports my assertion that the
law cares about the quality of adolescent judgment and that poli-
cies extending the freedom to make choices are limited by pater-
nalistic goals. In general, medical consent statutes give minors
the freedom to make "good" choices by some societal measure-
to seek beneficial treatment which might not be obtained if tradi-
tional parental authority were respected. 4' Few argue for ex-
tending to adolescents the right to make treatment decisions that
they may later regret, such as choices about cosmetic surgery and
sterilization. 42 Moreover, the statutes seldom accord minors a
right to refuse treatment that their parents or the state decide is
needed. Only in contexts (such as psychiatric hospitalization) in
which the benefit of treatment is ambiguous and the interest of
traditional decisionmakers may conflict with that of the child does
the issue of treatment refusal arise.43 In short, the medical con-
sent statutes, while they appear to endorse greater adolescent au-
tonomy, are equally consistent with a response directed toward
40. Arguments favoring independent access to abortions for adolescents
emphasize the burden of teenage pregnancy and the costs associated with a legal
requirement of parental involvement. See APA Hodgson brief, supra note 3, at 29.
Abortion presents another situation in which the traditional premise that par-
ents will act in the child's interest is uncertain.
41. Those who oppose adolescent access to abortion would not think, of
course, that abortion is a "good" choice. Those who favor adolescent access to
abortion likely do believe abortion is often a "good" choice, given the
alternatives.
42. Indeed, opposition to abortion is based, in part, on exactly this type of
argument-that young women who have abortions may later regret having had
them and that adolescents are not mature enough to anticipate this reaction.
Such an argument also provides a rationale for age requirements under steriliza-
tion statutes.
43. Statutory restrictions on parental authority to admit their children to
psychiatric hospitals are based, at least in part, on the perceptions that parents
may have a conflict of interest in this setting (in desiring to rid the family of a
difficult member) and that institutional treatment may not promote the child's
welfare. See Carol Warren & Patricia Guttridge, Adolescent Psychiatric Hospitaliza-
tion and Social Control, in MENTAL HEALTH AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 119, 120-21
(Linda Teplin ed., 1984) (describing adolescent hospitalization as means of so-
cial control); Lois A. Weithorn, Mental Hospitalization of Troublesome Youth: An
Analysis of Skyrocketing Admission Rates, 40 STAN. L. REV. 773, 789 (1988) (describ-
ing high percentage of adolescents in psychiatric hospitals presenting primarily
conduct problems). Another situation in which a minor's refusal of treatment is
legally recognized is where a minor refuses to consent to abortion. This "treat-
ment" is uniquely complex and cannot be categorized in the same way as other
treatments. The fetal life issue alone gives involuntary abortion different stakes
from other medical decisions.
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promoting adolescent welfare and reducing social cost. 44
B. Autonomy and Children's Welfare
It is not surprising that legal policies that seem directed to-
ward adolescent self-determination also reflect more traditional
paternalistic purposes. The desire to facilitate children's healthy,
happy development by providing them with necessary resources,
and by protecting them from others and from their own costly
choices is deeply rooted in our culture and pervasively influences
the law. What is less obvious is the extent to which proponents of
adolescent autonomy are also driven by the goal of promoting the
welfare of children.
Supporters of adolescent autonomy argue that self-determi-
nation is good for teenagers. The argument has several dimen-
sions. First, social scientists have argued that allowing
adolescents to participate in important decisions affecting their
lives will enhance their self-esteem, positively affect their identity
formation and increase their sense of personal causation and con-
trol.45 All these effects are associated with healthy psychological
development.46 Greater personal autonomy will also benefit ado-
lescents because they need experience in decisionmaking before
they enter adulthood. It makes little sense to assume that minors
restricted to a dependent status will cross the threshold to adult-
hood and magically be capable of mature functioning. Franklin
Zimring has described adolescence as a period of "semi-auton-
omy," in which youths should be given the freedom to make
44. My colleague, Bill Stuntz, provides another point that suggests that
medical consent statutes have a paternalistic cast. The treatments that are the
subject of these statutes are relatively low cost interventions. Thus, physicians
may have little incentive to urge unwanted or unwise interventions, reducing the
prospect of a conflict of interest between physicians and youthful patients that
might be present generally in the medical treatment context.
45. Gary B. Melton, Decision Making by Children: Psychological Risks and Benefits
in CHILDREN'S COMPETENCE TO CONSENT 21, 30-31 (Gary B. Melton et al. eds.,
1983) (discussing possibility that "increased autonomy would increase children's
performance in those spheres in which they had the opportunity to make
choices"); Charles R. Tremper & Morgan P. Kelly, The Mental Health Rationale for
Policies Fostering Minors'Autonomy, 10 INT'LJ. L. & PSYCHIATRY 111, 112-13 (1987)
(maintaining that strong linkages have been shown between autonomy and posi-
tive personal identity, self-actualization, internal locus of control and principled
moral reasoning).
46. Tremper & Kelly, supra note 45, at 112-13. David Wexler has made the
same argument about the benefits of participation in treatment decisions by
mentally disabled adults. See David B. Wexler, An Introduction to Therapeutic Juris-
prudence, in THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW AS A THERAPEUTIC AGENT 3,
8-16 (David B. Wexler ed., 1990).
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choices and take responsibility in a setting that protects them
from the long-term costs of their mistakes. 47 Such a "learner's
permit" will better prepare adolescents for full participation in
society. 48
Zimring is typical in his instrumentalist approach to auton-
omy in this context.49 Even advocates who endorse adolescent
self-determination far more strongly than does Zimring generally
do not support children's autonomy as an end in itself. Few ar-
gue that minors should be offered the self-determination ac-
corded to adults to make "bad" choices 50 even when evidence
supports that children can make adult-like decisions.
Two examples will clarify this point. The first example is Jus-
tice Douglas' dissent in Yoder, which argued for a decisionmaking
role for Amish students regarding their future educational status,
largely on grounds that young adolescents have adult-like compe-
tence. 5' On reflection, Douglas' position also seems to be a re-
sponse to the uncertainty concerning which outcome will
promote the welfare of these children, given the unique circum-
stances in which they live. It seems unlikely that Douglas would
favor giving all Wisconsin fourteen year olds the choice of
whether to continue their education on the ground that adoles-
cents are competent decisionmakers. When the superior out-
come is clear, arguments for expanded adolescent autonomy are
seldom heard.
The second example involves the waiver of Miranda rights by
juveniles. 52 Thomas Grisso compared minors' and adults' capac-
47. ZIMRING, supra note 14, at 90-91, 100.
48. Id. at 89-98. Zimring asserts that maturity, like many other skills and
activities in life, takes practice-a fact that justifies extending privileges to the
immature. Id. at 89.
49. Instrumentalist arguments can also be raised, of course, to support the
autonomy interests of adults. The difference is in the extent to which these ar-
guments seem important, and in the extent to which the asserted instrumental
benefit is linked to developmental characteristics. The autonomy interest of
adults is more likely to be asserted as an end in itself.
50. This is not to say that adults are not restricted in their authority to make
bad choices, even when only their own welfare appears to be at stake. In many
spheres, adults are subject to paternalist policies to protect them from the im-
pact of bad judgment. Examples can be found in landlord-tenant law, workplace
safety regulation and consumer protection law. The difference in policies to-
ward children is that paternalism is pervasive. In the regulation of adult behav-
ior (particularly when self-regarding acts are involved), paternalist policies are
more sparingly adopted.
51. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 245 n.3 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing in part).
52. Few states provide minors with special protection against "incompe-
tent" waiver of their Miranda rights. This stance is driven by the state's interest
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ity to understand Miranda warnings and found that minors aged
fifteen and older were able to understand the warnings as well as
adults.53 He did not suggest, however, that the validity of waivers
by older minors should be subject to the same standards as
adults. Instead, Grisso argues for a per se rule under which mi-
nors' confessions are excluded unless made in the presence of an
interested adult.54 This response seems to reveal a desire to pro-
tect juveniles, who tend to waive their Miranda rights at a signifi-
cantly higher rate than adults, 55 from waiving these rights. Most
would find the decision to waive Miranda rights unwise, even if the
decision is "competent." 56
It seems likely that this protective stance would be endorsed
by many proponents who, in other contexts, argue that adult-like
competence in adolescents demands a legal response of adult-like
liberty. The lesson here seems to be that the inclination to recog-
nize minors' autonomy interest is result-oriented. When the wel-
fare of minors seems threatened by self-determination, then
special treatment is endorsed and the paternalistic dimension of
the reform initiative becomes apparent. As the Miranda waiver
example suggests, this threat to a minor's welfare derives from
the conviction (which in the Miranda rights case is supported em-
pirically) that, in some contexts, adolescents will exercise poorer
judgment than adults. In these contexts, minors may require pro-
tection from their inclination to make poor choices, even if they
are, in some narrow sense, competent to make the decisions.
(often obscured in the juvenile justice system) in punishing youthful offenders
and protecting society against juvenile crime. Some states require that minors
be interrogated in the presence of their parents. See, e.g., OKLA. ST. ANN. tit. 10,
§ 1109(A) (West 1992). This response may offer little protection in practice,
because parents seldom counsel against waiver. See generally GRisso, supra note
11, at 161-90.
53. Thomas Grisso,Juveniles' Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights: An Empirical
Analysis, 68 CAL. L. REV. 1134, 1160 (1980). Grisso found that 15 and 16 year
olds whose I.Q.'s measured 80 or less had reduced comprehension. Id.
54. Id. at 1140-43, 1160-66.
55. Id. at 1134. The United States Supreme Court has rejected the argu-
ment that a per se test is constitutionally required in cases ofjuvenile waiver. See
Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979) (upholding constitutionality of to-
tality of circumstances standard).
56. The decision to waive Miranda rights is of course not "bad" in any ob-
jective sense. Indeed, it offers substantial societal benefits. In terms of the nar-
row self-interest of the waiving juvenile, however, the modern view is that a
waiver is unwise.
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II. COMPARING ADULTS AND MINORS UNDER AN INFORMED
CONSENT FRAMEWORK: THE RESEARCH AND ITS LIMITATIONS
The paternalist response does not mean that competence or
incompetence of minors is irrelevant in shaping policy to regulate
their lives. At some level, it clearly does matter whether, and to
what extent, minors of different ages are similar to adults in the
way in which they make decisions and perform functions that fall
within the scope of legal regulation. Ultimately, indeed, the via-
bility of the paternalistic framework depends on the empirical dif-
ference between the functioning of adults and minors. 57
Critics of the paternalistic norm that defines legal policy to-
ward children have drawn on developmental theory and social sci-
ence research to challenge the premise that minors are
incompetent and thus appropriately subject to adult decisionmak-
ing authority. In part because consent to medical treatment has
been a key focus of interest for advocates of adolescent rights, the
framework used to evaluate competence to make health care deci-
sions has been highly influential in shaping the inquiry generally.
Under this approach, the legal competence of minors is evaluated
through a comparison of their performance with that of adults on
legally constructed competence tests derived from informed con-
sent doctrine. In this part, I argue that this informed consent
framework is both scientifically and conceptually inadequate. Re-
search has not yet provided sufficient empirical evidence to sup-
port claims that no differences distinguish the cognitive
operations applied to decisionmaking by adolescents and those
applied by adults. 58 Moreover, the framework is too narrow in
scope. Whether policies restricting minors' choices are warranted
depends as much on how adolescentjudgment compares with adult
judgment as it does on how their more narrowly defined cognitive
operations compare.
57. In other words, if conclusive evidence were available that minors over
the age of 15 years, for example, were indistinguishable from adults in their cogni-
tive, intellectual and emotional functioning (as some have argued), then policy-
makers would be hard pressed to ignore this information. For a discussion of
this point, see infra note 198 and accompanying text.
58. One important limitation of the research is due to the impossibility of
"proving the null hypothesis"-that no differences exist-and the burdensome
nature of merely establishing the probability that no differences exist. See
CLAIRE SELLTIZ ET AL., RESEARCH METHODS IN SOCIAL RELATIONS (3d ed. 1976),
reprinted in JOHN MONAHAN & LAURENS WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW: CASES
AND MATERIALS 76, 76-79 (1990). For further discussion of the difficulties posed
in proving the null hypothesis, see infra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
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A. Competence under an Informed Consent Model
1. The Legal Framework
Much of the analysis of adolescent competence has focused
on medical decisionmaking. Even under the traditional legal
framework, medical decisions involving adolescents often have
been treated as a special category, and policymakers have strug-
gled with appropriate legal responses. The issue of whether mi-
nors should have independent authority in this realm has been
linked inevitably to the question of their decisionmaking compe-
tence. This is because informed consent doctrine requires that
medical treatment must be based on the patient's knowing, volun-
tary and intelligent consent. 59 If minors are to make independent
treatment decisions, it is assumed that they must be capable of
meeting the threshold legal requirement of competence. It is not
surprising, therefore, that much of the research on adolescent
legal competence has involved medical decisionmaking in either
laboratory or natural settings and has been structured to evaluate
competence under informed consent tests. 60 In turn, this re-
search has reinforced the importance of the informed consent
framework in defining adolescent competence.
59. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1064 (1972). The requirement that the consent be knowing creates a duty
of disclosure for the physician, who, under the modern approach, must disclose
to the patient all information about the treatment that a reasonable person
would find material in making a decision. Id. at 786-87. This includes the na-
ture of the procedure, risks, benefits and alternatives. Id. at 787-88. Some states
adhere to a standard of disclosure based on professional practice. See PAUL S.
APPELBAUM ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY AND CLINICAL PRACTICE
41-43 (1987). The decision also must be voluntary, in the sense that it is not
coerced by the healthcare provider. Id. at 60-62. The relevance of coercion
from other sources is unclear. Id. at 61-62. Finally, the requirement that the
consent be intelligent focuses on the ability to make the decision under applica-
ble competence tests using the disclosed information. For a discussion of tests
of competence under informed consent doctrine, see infra notes 60-62 and ac-
companying text.
Because adults are presumed competent to consent, the legal prescriptions
tend to focus on the disclosure requirement. See JUDITH AREEN ET AL., LAW, SCI-
ENCE AND MEDICINE 406-09 (1984) (reprinting informed consent statutes).
60. See, e.g., Bruce Ambuel &Julian Rappaport, Developmental Trends in Ado-
lescents' Psychological & Legal Competence to Consent to Abortion, 16 LAw & HUM.
BEHAV. 129 (1992) (comparing competency to consent to abortion of three age
groups of women-15 or younger, 16-17 and 18-21); Catherine C. Lewis, A Com-
parison of Minors'and Adults' Pregnancy Decisions, 50 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 446
(1980) (examining differences between minors and adults in pregnancy deci-
sionmaking); Lois A. Weithorn & Susan B. Campbell, The Competency of Children
and Adolescents to Make Informed Treatment Decisions, 53 CHILD DEV. 1589 (1982)
(studying decisionmaking by subjects nine to twenty-one years old in response
to medical and psychological treatment vignettes).
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Tests of competence under informed consent doctrine are
designed to evaluate the process of decisionmaking using a ra-
tional decisionmaking model. Although the emphasis varies de-
pending on the test, modern competence constructs focus on the
following decisionmaking elements: an understanding of relevant
disclosed information about the treatment (including conse-
quences, risks, benefits and alternatives); an ability to appreciate
the relevance of the information to one's situation; and an ability
to use the information to weigh the risks and benefits of different
options and to compare alternatives while making a choice.6 1
Tests under modern informed consent doctrine focus on the pro-
cess of decisionmaking. Although some traditional competence
tests evaluate the reasonableness of the choice, explicit emphasis
on outcome is excluded under contemporary constructs. 62 Thus,
61. Paul S. Appelbaum & Thomas Grisso, Assessing Patients' Capacities to Con-
sent to Treatment, 319 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1635, 1635-36 (1988). Appelbaum and
Grisso note that the majority of commentators identify four categories of legal
standards used to determine competence: (1) communicating choices; (2) un-
derstanding relevant information; (3) appreciating the situation and its conse-
quences; and (4) manipulating information rationally. Id. at 1635-36. The first
test only requires that a patient maintain and communicate a constant choice
long enough for a health care provider to implement the choice. Id. at 1635. To
meet the "understanding relevant information" standard, a patient must have
the capacity to remember information, to comprehend the importance of the
information for treatment, and to understand her role in the decisionmaking
process. Id. at 1636. To assess a patient under this standard, a doctor may ask
him or her to paraphrase and interpret the disclosed information. Id. Under the
appreciation standard, a patient must apply the relevant information to his or
her specific illness or assign a personal value to the information. Id. In as-
signing a personal value, the patient must include the "existence of illness, the
probable consequences of a treatment or its refusal, and the likelihood of each
of a number of consequences." Id. The inquiry focuses on the patient's under-
standing of his or her illness, the need for treatment, the probable outcomes as a
result of treatment, and the motives of those involved. Id. Under the rational
manipulation test, a patient must be capable of weighing information by com-
paring benefits and risks to reach a decision. Id. This standard focuses upon the
decisionmaking process-on the patient's ability to identify the major factors of
the illness and treatment and their importance, and to weigh those factors in the
decision. Id.
62. See Loren H. Roth et al., Tests of Competency to Consent to Treatment, 134
AM.J. PSYCHIATRY 279, 280-81 (1977); cf. APPELBAUM ET AL., supra note 59, at 87
(noting that standard that focuses on nature of decision undermines autonomy,
and, in effect, endorses physician judgment). The President's Commission for
the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Re-
search specifically rejects a competence standard that focuses on outcome.
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS: A
REPORT ON THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF INFORMED CONSENT IN THE
PATIENT-PRACTITIONER RELATIONSHIP 61 (1982). Such a standard, the Commis-
sion points out in its criticism, would find a patient incompetent "who makes a
health care decision that reflects values not widely held or that rejects conven-
tional wisdom about proper health care." Id. at 170. Despite the exclusion of
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under modern informed consent law, good judgment is not
required.
This focus on the process of decisionmaking and exclusion of
outcome evaluation is grounded largely in the overriding purpose
of protecting the autonomy interest of individuals making deci-
sions about medical interventions. A strong norm supports the
position that choices about treatment should reflect the subjective
values and preferences of decisionmakers, and that an objective
(or external) standard is not appropriate. Monitoring patients'
choices is deemed unduly intrusive given the private and self-
regarding character of medical decisions. 63 The requirements of
understanding and rationality for decisional competence also
serve the goal of promoting autonomy because a choice that is
irrational or that miscomprehends the options is not
autonomous.
The use of the framework derived from informed consent
doctrine to evaluate adolescent competence to make medical de-
cisions is relatively straightforward. Competence is assessed by
examining the individual's capacity to understand and appreciate
disclosed information and to engage in a rational decisionmaking
process. Advocates of this approach argue that if adults who are
legally competent to make treatment decisions under the applica-
ble test have authority to do so, then minors who are similarly
competent should have the same privilege. Under this approach,
the policy issue can be resolved by comparing the decisionmaking
performance of adolescents and adults to determine whether they
differ in legally relevant ways.
Applying this framework, proponents of adolescent self-de-
termination have argued that no significant differences separate
adults and adolescents in their capacity to make informed medical
decisions. 64 Social science evidence of adolescent decisionmak-
ing competence has been offered in particular contexts, such as
outcome in competence tests, "unreasonable" choices (such as the choice to
forego treatment) often will influence the assessment of competence. See Roth
et al., supra, at 280-81 (noting that "reasonable outcome" test is probably used
more often than physicians and courts might admit). In the same vein, the com-
petence of the patient who agrees with the physician's judgment will seldom be
questioned. Id. at 281.
63. A stance of excluding evaluation of outcome reasonableness can also be
defended on efficiency grounds, given enforcement and error costs of
monitoring.
64. See, e.g., APA Hodgson brief, supra note 3, at 21 (asserting that assump-
tion that adolescents are less capable than adults of understanding, reasoning
and making decisions is not supported by psychological research).
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abortion decisionmaking, 65 and in support of generally lowering
the age of medical consent. 66 This evidence has also been used in
support of broader claims for increased adolescent self-determi-
nation.67 It is perhaps not surprising that adolescent competence
in general has been analyzed within this framework. In effect,
competence to make medical decisions-a relatively straightfor-
ward construct defined by a legal test-has been used as a proxy
in other legal contexts in which competence is harder to measure
or is more vaguely defined. 68 For example, the law does not tell
us with any clarity what makes a teenager competent to decide
about his or her own custody when his or her parents divorce, 69
or why a fifteen year old, but not a five year old, has a meaningful
65. For a discussion of the social science advocacy efforts with regard to
adolescent abortion, see infra notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
66. See Patricia A. King, Treatment and Minors: Issues Not Involving Lifesaving
Treatment, 23J. FAM. L. 241, 252-53 (1984-1985) (asserting that minors 15 years
old and older should have right to self-determination regarding medical treat-
ment and that youths 11 to 14 can possess decisionmaking abilities that might
provide some claim to self-determination).
67. See Stephen B. Billick, Developmental Competency, 14 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSY-
CHIATRY & L. 301, 306-08 (1986) (arguing for general legal competence at age
14 based on developmental theory and research); Melton, supra note 3, at 102
(arguing for reversal of general presumption of adolescent incompetency on ba-
sis of developmental research).
68. On a few issues, such as competence to testify and to stand trial, specific
competence tests define the inquiry. See Lois A. Weithorn, Children's Capacities in
Legal Contexts, in CHILDREN, MENTAL HEALTH AND THE LAw, supra note 38, at 25-
50 (discussing legal standards for various competencies and relevant psychologi-
cal theories and research). On these issues, however, and particularly compe-
tence to testify, the focus is not on self-determination in decisionmaking. The
requirement of competence to testify is directed to safeguarding the quality of
evidence offered in judicial proceedings. See SAMUELJ. BRAKEL ET AL., THE MEN-
TALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 447 (3d ed. 1985). The requirement of compe-
tence to stand trial protects the fairness and integrity of criminal proceedings.
Id. at 694.
69. See Weithorn, supra note 68, at 45. Lois Weithorn suggests that an eval-
uation of capacity in this context focuses on understanding the nature of the
question and on the ability to contemplate and compare the alternatives of living
with each parent in the future. Id. at 43. This approach is derived from in-
formed consent requirements. Weithorn, however, is not wholly comfortable
with this approach or implicitly with how well the informed consent framework
"fits" custody decisions. Id. at 45. She suggests that informed consent require-
ments may restrict the child's self-determination excessively. See id. at 42-45.
Ellen Garrison has adapted Weithorn's approach in studying competence of
children to participate in custody decisions. See Ellen G. Garrison, Children's
Competence to Participate in Divorce Custody Decisionmaking, 20 J. CLINICAL CHILD
PSYCHOL. 79 (1991). Garrison tested subjects under two competence standards,
the traditional "reasonableness of preference" test and the "rationality of rea-
sons" test. Id. at 79. She argued that the reasonableness of preference standard
is inadequate as a measure of competence because the custody decision is value-
laden and subjective. Id. at 84.
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interest in political expression. 70 Claims about competence
grounded in the informed consent framework presume that com-
petence findings in one sphere are applicable in others. 71
2. The Scientific Evidence for Adolescent Competence
The theoretical foundation for the assertion that adolescents
and adults are similar in their decisionmaking capability is psy-
chologist Jean Piaget's stage theory of cognitive development. 72
Piaget posited that between the ages of eleven and fourteen, chil-
dren reach the stage of formal operations, the highest stage of
cognitive development. 73 In this stage, the individual can think
about a problem hypothetically and consider alternative solu-
tions, anticipating, weighing and comparing consequences.74 Be-
cause the process of making competent medical decisions
requires the use of these cognitive abilities, Piaget's theory indi-
cates that adolescents who have reached this stage possess the
cognitive capacity to make decisions in an adult-like manner. 75
A small body of empirical research lends support to this
claim about adolescent decisionmaking competence. A few stud-
ies have compared the approaches of minors and adults making
health care decisions and found few differences. Lois Weithorn
and Susan Campbell compared youths and adults making deci-
sions about different types of medical and psychological treat-
ment by responding to different scenarios in a laboratory
70. Tinker recognized that minors as young as 13 have a meaningful interest
in political expression. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393
U.S. 503, 504, 511-14 (1969). An eight year old Tinker child, however, who also
participated in the protest, was not a party to the suit. Id. at 516 (Black,
dissenting).
71. Melton, supra note 3, at 99-100.
72. See generally JOHN H. FLAVELL, COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT 92-101 (2d ed.
1985) (describing generalizations drawn from Piaget's theories on cognitive de-
velopment); BARBEL INHELDER &JEAN PIAGET, THE GROWTH OF LOGICAL THINK-
ING FROM CHILDHOOD TO ADOLESCENCE (1952) (describing cognitive
development in children between 11 and 15 years of age); ROBERT S. SIEGLER,
CHILDREN'S THINKING 20-21, 26-38 (2d ed. 1991) (describing different develop-
mental stages outlined by Piaget).
73. SIEGLER, supra note 72, at 20-21.
74. Id. at 37-38.
75. See APA Zbaraz brief, supra note 3, at 13-15; Weithorn & Campbell, supra
note 60, at 1590-91. Thomas Grisso and Linda Vierling were the first to suggest
that the application of cognitive development theory to informed consent doc-
trine supports the position that by mid-adolescence minors are legally compe-
tent to make medical decisions. Grisso & Vierling, supra note 5, at 423. The
authors argue that adolescents age 15 and older are able to provide knowing,
intelligent and voluntary consent while youths ages 11 to 14 generally are un-
able to intelligently and voluntarily render consent. Id.
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setting.76 They found that fourteen year olds were similar to
adults in their reasoning processes and in their factual and
inferential understanding of information about medical condi-
tions and treatment options. 77 Catherine Lewis studied a small
group of adult and adolescent women awaiting results of preg-
nancy tests who were, thus, potentially confronted with a medical
decision. 78 She found few age-related differences between mi-
nors and adults in knowledge of the applicable law, persons con-
sulted or reasoning process. 79 Bruce Ambuel and Julian
Rappaport studied a larger sample of minors and adults contem-
plating a decision about an unplanned pregnancy.80 Their evalu-
ation of different aspects of decisionmaking-consideration of
consequences, number of reasons given (richness of reasoning),
volition (freedom from undue influence) and quality of reason-
ing-indicated no differences between adolescents and adults
considering abortion.8' These studies focused primarily on the
subjects' understanding of information and capacity to make deci-
sions through a rational process.8 2
76. Weithorn & Campbell, supra note 60.
77. See id. at 1595-96. The 14 year olds were found to demonstrate adult-
like competence under four different standards: evidence of choice, reasonable
outcome, rational reasons and understanding. Id. at 1595.
78. Lewis, supra note 60, at 446.
79. Id. at 447-51.
80. Ambuel & Rappaport, supra note 60. The minors were 13-15 and 16-17
years old. Id. at 134, 140.
81. Id. at 140-42.
82. See, e.g., Weithorn & Campbell, supra note 60, at 1590-91. The Wei-
thorn and Campbell study evaluated the responses under the traditional (and
now disfavored) standard that looks at the reasonableness of the choice, as well
as under other tests of competence. Id. at 1591-93. The performance of 14 year
olds generally equalled that of the adults, but "numerically small but statistically
significant differences" were found between 14 year olds and adults in one treat-
ment choice for the epilepsy dilemma. Id. at 1596. The recommended medica-
tion rejected by 12.5% of the 14 year olds was reported as having potential side
effects: periodontal problems and hirsutism (excess growth of body hair). Id.
The researchers suggested that these findings may be explained by early adoles-
cent concerns about body image and physical attractiveness. Id. The findings
also led Weithorn and Campbell to hypothesize that competence may be some-
what dependent upon the specific decisionmaking context. Id. The adolescents,
however, were no different from the adults in their capacity to "understand,"
which is the most recognized informed consent standard. Id.
Garrison, in a rare study of decisionmaking outside of the health care con-
text, evaluated competency to participate in divorce custody decisions under an
informed consent framework. See Garrison, supra note 69. In part, her study
involved judicial assessment of the reasonableness of the preferences of subjects
ages 9 to 18. Id. at 80. She also examined the rationality of the decisionmaking
process. Id. at 79. The only differences she found, based on judges' ratings,
were between 10 year olds and older subjects. Id. at 84.
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Another study examined an aspect of decisionmaking that is
relevant to the legal requirement of voluntariness under informed
consent doctrine.8 3 Using vignettes, David Scherer examined the
extent to which minors and young adults making health care deci-
sions might be subject to the coercive influence of their parents.84
He found no clear developmental patterns across different kinds
of treatments.8 5 Scherer's findings did suggest that, for more se-
rious treatment decisions, confidence in the face of parental op-
position increases with age.8 6
Several researchers have studied minors' capacity for under-
standing in different contexts, without directly looking at deci-
sionmaking. Ronald Belter and Thomas Grisso compared the
ability of minors (ages nine and fifteen) and adults (age twenty-
one) to understand and assert rights in psychotherapy. 8 7 They
found that adolescents and adults showed similar capabilities,
while younger children were less able to discern violations of
their rights. 8 Nancy Kaser-Boyd and her colleagues examined
the ability of children and adults to identify the risks and benefits
83. Voluntariness is not a dimension of legal competence per se. It is an
additional requirement of informed consent. It is relevant to the discussion,
however, because developmentally based susceptibility to influence might affect
the ability to make autonomous decisions.
84. David G. Scherer, The Capacities of Minors to Exercise Voluntariness in Medi-
cal Treatment Decisions, 15 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 431 (1991). For an earlier study
that focused only on younger decisionmakers (and did not compare their per-
formance with adults), see David G. Scherer & N. Dickon Reppucci, Adolescents'
Capacities to Provide Voluntary Informed Consent: The Effects of Parental Influence and
Medical Dilemmas, 12 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 123 (1988). Both studies tested sus-
ceptibility to parental influence by having the interviewer present a second hy-
pothetical involving parental disagreement with the subject's first choice. See
Scherer, supra, at 437; Scherer & Reppucci, supra, at 129.
85. Scherer, supra note 84, at 442. In two of the three vignettes (hypotheti-
cals) posed, treatment decisions made by children were not significantly differ-
ent from those made by young adults. Id.
86. Id. at 442-43. Thus, older subjects were less susceptible to information
of parental disagreement with decisions about kidney donation than were
younger decisionmakers, although older subjects were more responsive to pa-
rental wishes regarding minor treatments than were younger subjects. Id.
87. Ronald W. Belter & Thomas Grisso, Children's Recognition of Rights Viola-
tions in Counseling, 15 PROF. PSYCHOL. 899 (1984). Belter and Grisso evaluated a
sample of 60 males at ages 9, 15 and 21 in which the subjects were given infor-
mation about their "rights" in counseling (right to refuse treatment, to know the
reason for referral, to withhold information from the counselor, etc.) and about
protection of their rights. Id. at 902. At age 9, providing information about
rights had minimal effect; at ages 15 and 21, the authors observed higher scores
for rights recognition. Id. at 907-09. This study suggests no difference between
the 15 year olds' and 21 year olds' ability to understand rights violations. See id.
at 907.
88. Id. at 907-08.
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of psychotherapy; they found little to support the belief that chil-
dren were less able to do so than adults.89 Finally, Grisso's com-
prehensive study comparing minors' and adults' capacities to
understand their Miranda rights revealed that by age fifteen ado-
lescents of average intelligence demonstrated an ability that was
similar to adults, while younger minors performed significantly
less well. 90
B. A Critique of the Informed Consent Model
Law-psychology advocates have argued that this theoretical
and empirical research demonstrates that by mid-adolescence mi-
nors are indistinguishable from adults in their decisionmaking ca-
pacity, and that legal restrictions inconsistent with this evidence
are inappropriate. The unequivocal character of this claim and
the adherence to the informed consent framework can be linked
to the central importance of adolescent abortion as an advocacy
issue. 91 It is in this context that the informed consent framework
has been refined and most extensively employed. In my view, it is
unfortunate that psychology's effort to contribute to legal under-
standing of adolescent decisionmaking capability has focused so
extensively on the issue of abortion. Because of its intensely po-
larized and politicized character, abortion discourse tends to be
dominated by advocacy norms; this is not the best environment
for science to function according to its own values. 92 Indeed,
89. Nancy Kaser-Boyd et al., Children's Understanding of Risks and Benefits of
Psychotherapy, 15J. CLINICAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 165, 168-71 (1986) (studying sub-
jects ages 10 to 19 and finding no significant differences between age groups in
ability to process information about risks and benefits of psychological treat-
ment); Nancy Kaser-Boyd et al., Minors' Ability to Identify Risks and Benefits of Ther-
apy, 16 PROF. PSYCHOL. 411, 416 (1985) (studying subjects ages 10 to 20 and
finding that younger minors were not significantly different from older minors in
identifying risks and benefits of psychotherapy).
90. Grisso, supra note 53, at 1152, 1154-60. In several studies using differ-
ent methodologies, Grisso probed the capacity of minors and adults to under-
stand the vocabulary, meaning and function of Miranda warnings. See id.
91. Organized psychology has been very involved in the effort to fight re-
strictions on adolescent access to abortion. As described earlier, the American
Psychological Association has submitted amicus briefs to the Supreme Court in
several cases, arguing that adolescents are competent to make abortion deci-
sions, based on the psychological research. For a discussion of these briefs, see
supra note 3. Moreover, an interdivisional task force of the APA has issued a
policy statement supportive of adolescent abortion rights. See Interdivisional
Committee on Adolescent Abortion, Adolescent Abortion: Psychological and Legal Is-
sues, 42 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 73 (1987). The statement asserts that adolescents
are as capable of conceptualizing and reasoning about treatment alternatives as
adults, and that perceived differences have to do with differences in social situa-
tion rather than psychological maturity. Id. at 73.
92. For a thoughtful analysis of the perils associated with the involvement
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those who oppose restrictions on adolescent abortion may be re-
luctant to challenge either the conclusions or approach of law-
psychology advocates, because questioning the informed consent
framework or the empirical conclusions could undermine political
goals.
In some sense, psychologists who have argued on compe-
tence grounds that minors seeking abortion should be subject
only to restrictions applied to adults have become committed
both to the informed consent framework and to the position that
adolescent and adult decisionmaking are not significantly differ-
ent.93 This perspective presumes that the framework poses the
right questions 94 and that the answers are settled. These pre-
sumptions are erroneous. In this political climate, the goal of in-
fluencing policy threatens to eclipse that of learning about how
adolescents compare to adults in their decisionmaking.
1. The Scientific Limits of the Competence Model
The scientific theory and data that are the basis for the argu-
ment favoring adolescent rights cast doubt on the traditional legal
presumption that minors are less competent decisionmakers than
adults. As William Gardner and others have demonstrated, how-
ever, the evidence does not establish the contrary proposition-
that no differences in decisionmaking separate minors and
adults. 95 Those who argue that evidence derived from the in-
of "organized psychology" in constitutional litigation, see Thomas Grisso &
Michael J. Saks, Psychology's Influence on Constitutional Interpretation: A Comment on
How to Succeed, 15 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 205 (1991) (distinguishing proper objec-
tives of participation in constitutional litigation by APA from improper
objectives).
93. This stance also forecloses empirical input on issues such as the juve-
nile death penalty. See Donald N. Bersoff, Autonomy For Vulnerable Populations: The
Supreme Court's Reckless Disregard For Self-Determination And Social Science, 37 VILL. L.
REV. 1571 (1992).
94. Although it is useful as a litigation strategy, focusing on competence to
make the medical decision obscures the underlying policy debate. In my view,
the fight about restricting adolescents' free access to abortion is a fight about
abortion and about.teenage pregnancy in a new arena. For pro-life advocates,
the issue is the "competence" to decide to kill a fetus. For pro-choice support-
ers, it is about a young woman's right (and, perhaps, her competence) to choose
not to be a mother, with its attendant burdens, and about society's interest in
avoiding the social costs of teenage pregnancy. The issue of competence to de-
cide about the medical treatment is surely subsidiary.
Focusing on abortion has also obscured the importance of judgment as a
relevant measure of adolescent competency. To be sure, a minor may reveal
immaturity in approaching the abortion. However, given the sharp division over
the issue, advocates on each side of the controversy may be inclined to believe
that only one outcome is consistent with good judgment.
95. See Gardner et al., supra note 6, at 897. Gardner, Scherer and Tester
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formed consent framework demonstrates that adolescents have
adult-like decisionmaking competence have overstepped the lim-
its of science. First, the strict stage theory of cognitive develop-
ment on which they rely is no longer widely accepted among
cognitive psychologists. Second, only sparse empirical data sup-
port the proposition that the reasoning process, understanding
and voluntariness of adolescent decisionmakers approximates
that of adults, and the data is of limited generalizability. Even if
the informed consent framework incorporated all relevant dimen-
sions of decisionmaking, scientific authority for the claim of ado-
lescent legal competence would be very tentative.
Piaget's stage theory of cognitive development has come
under fire in recent years. Today, few cognitive psychologists ac-
cept that cognitive development is strictly stage-like-that is, that
children in a given stage engage in a characteristic reasoning pro-
cess across many tasks, and that this process differs from reason-
ing at other stages.96 Rather, recent research has revealed that
similar skills develop at different rates in different task domains.97
This conception undermines the informed consent framework be-
cause it does not support the notion of a cognitive ability (i.e., to
engage in formal operations) that is linked to a general decision-
making capability. A finding of competence to make one kind of
have provided a thoughtful and persuasive critique of the decisionmaking com-
petence framework as it has been used to support adolescent abortion rights.
My observations draw heavily on their analysis, which convincingly points out
both the theoretical and empirical weakness of the scientific claims that have
been advanced about adolescent competence. See id.; William Gardner, A Life-
Span Theory of Risk-taking, in ADOLESCENT & ADULT RISK-TAKING: THE EIGHTH
TEXAS TECH SYMPOSIUM ON INTERFACES IN PSYCHOLOGY (N. Bell ed., forthcom-
ing); William Gardner & Janna Herman, Developmental Change in Decision-
Making: Use of Multiplicative Strategies & Sensitivity to Losses (April 19, 199 1)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Villanova Law Review); William Gard-
ner et al., Developmental Change in Decision-Making (November 4, 1991 draft)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Villanova Law Review); Maya Tester et
al., Experimental Studies of the Development of Decision-Making Competence, presented
at the symposium Children, Risks & Decisions: Psychological & Legal Implications at
American Psychological Ass'n Convention (August, 1987).
96. SIEGLER, supra note 72, at 49-57.
97. See id. at 57. In part, the challenge to Piaget's theory is based on re-
search indicating that cognitive development is more continuous and gradual
than stage theory suggests. Id. at 51. Moreover, children appear to master simi-
lar cognitive tasks in a given stage at different ages. Id. For example, children
master the concrete operations concept of solid mass conservation (recognizing
that a given amount of sand poured into a tall beaker and then into a fat beaker
is the same) before that of weight conservation (recognizing that weight stays
the same when a clay ball is remolded into sausage). Id.; see also FLAVELL, supra
note 72, at 114 (discussing growing doubt that cognitive systems develop in
stage-like manner).
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decision cannot be generalized to other decisions in other
settings.
Even if it were grounded on a more solid theoretical founda-
tion, the existing body of empirical research is inadequate to sup-
port the assertion that minors are similar to adults in their
decisionmaking competence. 98 To date, only a handful of studies
have compared decisionmaking by adults to that of adolescents,
and most have examined only a small number of subjects. 99 The
two abortion studies have focused on only one type of decision-
about a treatment that has unique properties. 100 A few other
studies have compared the comprehension of minors and adults
in legal settings, but do not focus on decisionmaking.' 0l Finally,
a handful of studies have examined adolescents' understanding of
issues involved in treatment, but have not compared adolescents
with adults or focused on decisionmaking.l02
Although these studies, taken together, challenge traditional
notions about minors' capabilities, they are too few in number to
establish the "no difference" proposition. Moreover, this defi-
ciency is exaggerated by the fact that the asserted claim involves
the confirmation of a null hypothesis-that no differences exist.
A positive claim of this kind requires a great deal of empirical
substantiation, using convergent methodologies. 103 The fact that
98. The deficiencies in the research raise questions primarily about the ex-
ternal validity of the findings. The external validity of research is measured by
the extent to which the findings are generalizable across persons, settings or
time. MONAHAN & WALKER, supra note 58, at 50. Internal validity refers to the
accuracy of the inferences drawn as applied to the circumstances of the study
itself. Id.
99. See Ambuel & Rappaport, supra note 60, at 134-35 (study had 75 sub-
jects ranging from 13 to 21 years old); Lewis, supra note 60, at 446 (ages ranged
from 13 years-one month to 25 years-six months; of 42 interviewees, 16 were
minors); Weithorn & Campbell, supra note 60, at 1591 (study had 96 subjects
ranging from 9 to 21 years old). Weithorn cautioned that her subjects were
"normal," white, healthy individuals of high intelligence and middle class back-
grounds who considered "hypothetical" cases, and that these factors might af-
fect the study's external validity or generalizability. Weithorn & Campbell, supra
note 60, at 1596.
100. See Ambuel & Rappaport, supra note 60; Lewis, supra note 60.
101. Grisso, supra note 53 (comparing capacity of minors to that of adults in
understanding Miranda warnings); Belter & Grisso, supra note 87 (comparing ca-
pacity of minors to that of adults in understanding and asserting rights in
psychotherapy).
102. Kaser-Boyd et al., Minors' Ability to Identify Risks and Benefits of Therapy,
supra note 89 (examining adolescents' ability to identify risks and benefits of psy-
chotherapy); Kaser-Boyd et al., Children's Understanding of Risks and Benefits of Ther-
apy, supra note 89 (examining adolescents' understanding of risks and benefits of
psychotherapy).
103. See SELLTIZ, supra note 58.
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no differences have yet been observed does not mean that none
exist. It may mean only that differences have not been uncovered
because researchers have failed to ask the right questions. 10 4
In addition to the fact that there is simply too little research
to make strong claims, other limitations of the existing studies
restrict the inferences that can be drawn. First, most of the stud-
ies were conducted in a laboratory setting in which the subjects
were provided with the relevant information for making hypothet-
ical treatment decisions.' 0 5 Although this kind of research pro-
vides much useful data about decisionmaking, some questions
about external validity arise.' 0 6 Having nothing at stake, subjects
may give what they view as appropriate responses; such responses
may not reveal emotional, social or cognitive factors that could
influence their choices in making real treatment decisions. Find-
ings of studies using the informed consent format are limited in
another way. Because subjects are provided with all relevant in-
formation and then asked to make a decision, comparisons are
only applicable to similar structured contexts. We know little
about the sources, range or use of information when adolescents
104. See Gardner et. al., supra note 6, at 897-99. For example, Gardner con-
tends that researchers have failed to inquire about possible key differences be-
tween adolescent and adult decisionmaking, such as effects of emotional arousal
on decisionmaking, or the degree to which adolescents can sift through an over-
abundance of information .o find relevant facts the way adults do. Id. at 898.
This article argues that aspects of decisionmaking relevant to judgment have not
been tested.
105. See Belter & Grisso, supra note 87, at 901-03 (documenting that in first
session, therapy "rights" were explained; in second session, subjects viewed
videotaped counseling session and were asked to identify rights violations);
Kaser-Boyd et al., Minors'Ability to Identify Risks and Benefits of Therapy, supra note
89, at 413 (dividing subjects into groups of those who were therapy-inexperi-
enced, those previously in therapy, and those currently in therapy; subjects were
asked to list risks and benefits of therapy); Kaser-Boyd et al., Children's Under-
standing of Risks and Benefits of Psychotherapy, supra note 89, at 167-68 (asking par-
ticipants with varying degrees of therapy experience/inexperience to categorize
statements as risks of therapy, benefits of therapy or irrelevant to therapy and
then to determine from hypotheticals whether child considering therapy would
or would not enter therapy and to explain their reasons); Scherer, supra note 84,
at 436 (asking subjects to make treatment decision based on hypothetical);
Scherer & Reppucci, supra note 84, at 129 (asking subjects to make treatment
decision based on hypothetical); Weithorn & Campbell, supra note 60, at 1591-
93 (documenting that participants listened to audiotape of treatment dilemma
and then were interviewed). The abortion decision studies were conducted in a
natural setting. See Ambuel & Rappaport, supra note 60, at 134-37 (interviews
conducted at women's health center after participants underwent pregnancy
test); Lewis, supra note 60, at 446-47 (interviews conducted in small private
rooms at pregnancy clinics while subjects awaited pregnancy test results).
106. For a discussion of external validity, see supra note 98.
ADOLESCENT DECISIONMAKING
are making choices in more informal settings. ' 07 Finally, as Gard-
ner and his colleagues have pointed out, much of the information
about the subjects' cognitive decisionmaking processes consists of
retrospective self-reports, a poor substitute for contemporaneous
observation. 10 8
Another deficiency weakens the usefulness of the research as
a base for evaluating adolescent decisionmaking capability. Find-
ings about the influence of others on adolescent decisionmaking
are not only meager, they are inconclusive in their implications
for the important issue of voluntariness under informed consent
doctrine.' 0 9 David Scherer observed some differences between
adults and adolescents in response to parental influence.
Although he found no systematic developmental pattern,
Scherer's study suggests that adults may be less susceptible to in-
fluence than younger subjects when considering more important
medical decisions."10 Given the widely shared intuition that mi-
nors are susceptible to influence not only from parents but from
peers," ' the question of whether differences relevant to volunta-
riness exist is unresolved.
Taken together, the existing research represents an initial
step toward understanding how adolescent decisionmaking com-
pares to that of adults. It certainly casts doubt on the presump-
tion that adolescent reasoning and understanding are inferior.
Our current state of knowledge is far too inconclusive, however,
to support a positive claim that no differences distinguish adoles-
107. For a more thorough discussion of the unknowns associated with deci-
sionmaking in formal settings, see infra notes 168-73 and accompanying text.
108. See Gardner et al., supra note 6, at 898. Cognitive scientists are not
certain that a subject can accurately report the influences on his or her thinking.
Id.
109. The legal requirement of voluntariness has vague contours. The kind
and extent of coercion necessary to render a decision involuntary is unclear. It
is unlikely that influence, per se, is sufficiently coercive. Moreover, coercion
from parents or peers is less relevant than coercion by health care providers.
However, the voluntariness requirement is based on a policy of ensuring auton-
omous independent medical decisions, a goal that is undermined if decisions
reflect the values and preferences of someone other than the decisionmaker. See
APPELBAUM ET AL., supra note 59, at 60-62. The only studies that have focused
on the influence of others on minors' decisions made in a legal context are by
David Scherer and N. Dickon Reppucci. See Scherer & Reppucci, supra note 84.
For a discussion of how other research has examined peer influence on decisions
in non-legal contexts, but the relevance of these studies has been obscured here-
tofore, see infra notes 127-90 and accompanying text.
110. Scherer, supra note 84, at 443.
111. For a discussion of the research evidence supporting this intuition, see
infra notes 127-32 and accompanying text.
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cent and adult decisionmaking, and that the research findings in
themselves dictate a direction for legal policy.
2. Competence and Judgment
Even if further research confirms that adults and adolescents
have similar capacities to understand information and make deci-
sions through a rational process, this conclusion will not fully re-
solve the issue of whether and when adolescents should be
subject to the same legal treatment as adults. To be sure, the
legal presumption that minors are incompetent rests, in part, on
the belief that minors' capacities for understanding and for mak-
ing choices through a rational process are less developed than are
those of adults. Protective policies are also based on a presump-
tion, however, that minors and adults differ in their decisions and
behavior in ways that go beyond the requirements for compe-
tence under informed consent doctrine. The paternalistic norm
is supported by a presumption that, in general, the judgment of
adolescents is less mature than that of adults, and that the out-
comes adolescents choose reflects this immaturity.' 12 In essence,
the societal intuition is that adolescents make poorer choices than
adults, due to a variety of social, emotional and cognitive influ-
ences that are developmental in nature. As the analysis in Part I
suggests, protecting minors (and others) from the costs of their
own poor choices is a core rationale of paternalistic policies.
Thus, evaluating competence in an informed consent framework
provides an incomplete account of how minors' decisionmaking
compares with that of adults.
As I have suggested, it is for good reason that legal compe-
tence constructs under modern informed consent doctrine ex-
clude evaluation of outcomes and thus of individual judgment.
112. The Supreme Court has endorsed this presumption in several opin-
ions, including those dealing with adolescent abortion. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird,
443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979) ("[D]uring the formative years of childhood and ado-
lescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recog-
nize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them."). One of the clearest
statements of this presumption was in a case involving psychiatric hospitalization
decisions. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979). In Parham, the Supreme
Court stated:
The law's concept of the family rests on a presumption that parents
possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for
judgment required for making life's difficult decisions .... Most chil-
dren, even in adolescence, simply are not able to make sound judg-
ments concerning many decisions, including their need for medical
care or treatment.
Id. at 602-03.
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The doctrine, and therefore the tests, are directed toward the
goal of promoting individual autonomy by maximizing patient
control over the bodily intrusion of medical intervention.'13 If
the patient understands the relevant information and makes a
choice through a rational process, then no one should have au-
thority to monitor the "quality" of the outcome. The decision
should reflect the subjective values of the decisionmaker, even if
those values lead to idiosyncratic outcomes which most others
would reject. Thus, in theory at least, under informed consent
doctrine, adults are free to make poor decisions (from the per-
spective of others) as long as their understanding and reasoning
are not greatly impaired." 14 The legal test for competence is con-
ceived as a checkpoint and not as a roadblock to individual
choice.' 15
Should policymakers care whether or not adolescents system-
atically differ from adults in the substantive choices they make or
in the factors that shape their decisions? Although few who have
argued for expanded adolescent rights using the informed con-
sent framework have given much attention to this question, it can
be inferred that the answer for some is clearly "no." ' 1 6 In part,
113. See JAY KATZ & ALEXANDER M. CAPRON, CATASTROPHIC DISEASES: WHO
DECIDES WHAT? 82 (1975). Katz and Capron describe the promotion of individ-
ual autonomy as a primary function of informed consent. Id. For a discussion of
the central importance of autonomy to informed consent doctrine, see APPEL-
BAUM ET AL., supra note 59, at 17-32. For a discussion clarifying that competing
values are at stake in medical decisionmaking, see Alan Meisel, The "Exceptions"
to the Informed Consent Doctrine: Striking a Balance Between Competing Values in Medical
Decisionmaking, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 413.
114. Competence tests that focus on the quality of the outcome have been
subject to intense criticism and are generally disfavored. See Roth et al., supra
note 62, at 281. Appelbaum and colleagues analyze the tension between the
value of health care and the value of autonomy. APPELBAUM ET AL., supra note
59, at 28-31. They point out that courts, although they try to accommodate the
two values, are reluctant to compromise autonomy and that courts therefore
place decisional authority with the patient. Id. at 30-31. Appelbaum and col-
leagues criticize any test of competence that focuses on outcome on the grounds
that it undermines autonomy and is "paternalistic to an extreme." Id. at 87; see
also Meisel, supra note 113, at 451 (describing danger that finding of incompe-
tence will be based on patient's making decision not approved by physician).
115. Another aspect of legal competence requirements that also reflects au-
tonomy goals is that adults making medical decisions are presumed to be com-
petent, a presumption that is not routinely challenged. See APPELBAUM ET AL.,
supra note 59, at 92 (describing legal presumption of competence); Appelbaum
& Grisso, supra note 61, at 1635 (noting that presumption of patients' compe-
tence recognized by both physicians and law).
116. Certainly the premise of the advocacy literature, although sometimes
unstated, is often that competence under the applicable legal test should be dis-
positive of legal authority. Thus, arguments for greater legal authority for ado-
lescents are based on research evidence that adolescents are competent under
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this presumably negative response reflects an ideological stance
that simply favors policies promoting personal autonomy. 1 7
Apart from a preference for autonomy, however, this position can
be derived from the doctrinal premises of the informed consent
framework itself. If the legal competence of adults does not in-
volve considerations ofjudgment, according to this argument, the
same principle should hold for minors who fulfill competence
requirements.
At one level, the response to this argument is simple. The
analysis is incomplete because it examines tests for decisionmak-
ing competence in a vacuum, discounting policy contexts that dif-
fer for adults and minors. It is precisely the belief that differences
between adolescent and adult judgment exist that drives the
traditional paternalistic policies toward youth. Thus, the fact that
tests that are applied to adults generally exclude any inquiry into
substantive outcomes or judgment simply means that such tests
do not evaluate dimensions of decisionmaking that are relevant in
formulating policy regulating minors. In some contexts, age re-
strictions based on an intuition that younger minors have poorer
judgment are uncontroversial. For example, few would argue,
on "competence" grounds, that twelve year olds who can pass the
legally required written and performance tests should be awarded
a license to drive a motor vehicle.
The case that judgment is appropriately considered in evalu-
ating adolescent legal capacity rests in part on a straightforward
claim that the social cost of a different response would be exces-
sive. Informed consent policy reflects a conclusion that the im-
portance of respecting adults' autonomy in the context of health
informed consent tests. See APA Hodgson brief, supra note 3 (arguing that adoles-
cents should have legal authority to make abortion decisions based on research
showing competence under legal tests); Gittler et al., supra note 5, at 24-29, 49-
50, 54 (arguing that adolescents should have legal authority if they are minimally
competent under tests, even if adolescents, on average, are less competent);
King, supra note 66, at 252-53 (arguing that research demonstrates that adoles-
cents can meet legal tests and thus should have authority). The general view is
that if adolescents are able to "conceptualize and reason" about medical deci-
sions, then no justification exists for "age-graded policies." Interdivisional
Committee on Adolescent Abortion, supra note 91, at 73, 75. I have not found
any discussion of the issue presented in the literature, possibly because the rele-
vance of judgment to adolescent "competence" has not been recognized.
117. Certainly the scholarship and other pronouncements of leading advo-
cates such as Gary Melton, Lois Weithorn and Donald Bersoff (chief author of
the APA adolescent abortion briefs, supra note 3) reveal this preference and the
view that self-determination and personhood are linked. See Melton, supra note
25, at 482; Melton, supra note 3, at 101-02; Weithorn, supra note 23, at 85; Ber-
sof, supra note 93, at 1569.
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care decisions outweighs the social cost of poor decisions by
"outliers," particularly given the substantial costs of any other
policy.'"" It is plausible to assume that most people are moti-
vated to make health-promoting medical decisions, i.e., to use
good judgment, and thus that the social cost of respecting auton-
omy is tolerable.1 19 This conclusion does not mean that if, in an-
other context, the social cost of poor judgment is more
substantial, autonomy concerns will nonetheless triumph. As so-
cial costs increase, legal intervention becomes more acceptable.
This is obvious when poor judgment results in harm to others. 20
However, even self-regarding actions can have unacceptable so-
cial consequences. For example, seat belt and motorcycle helmet
laws restrict freedom to make poor decisions in situations in
which the social cost, although largely internalized, is significant.
If adolescents generally have poorer judgment than adults,
then the social cost of according them freedom will be significant
in some contexts. Legal restriction is not punitive, but a response
based on a frequently employed policy calculus. In many, and
perhaps even most, legal contexts, the value of personal freedom
is balanced implicitly against the anticipated social cost of poor
judgment. If these costs fall primarily on juvenile decisionmakers
themselves, then the case for restriction may be enhanced be-
cause the societal interest in preventing harm to this group is par-
ticularly acute. Protecting minors from the harm that can result
from their own poor judgment seems important in order to pre-
serve the options of youthful decisionmakers for a future when, it
is presumed, they will make sounder choices.
The legitimacy of a paternalistic response seems to hinge on
118. The costs of a policy of placing decisionmaking about medical treat-
ment in the hands of physicians are obvious, given the potential for a conflict of
interest. Administrative or judicial review of physician decisions would add to
the cost.
For a discussion of the tension between a policy of promoting autonomy
and of promoting health care, and of the ways in which the law seeks to accom-
modate these two interests, see APPELBAUM ET AL., supra, note 59, at 28-31.
119. In the area of preventive health care, much evidence suggests that
many people do not make health promoting decisions. For example, the social
costs of alcohol and tobacco consumption are high, and yet autonomy is not
restricted. This is because enforcement costs of restriction or prohibition are
also high, as our experience with the prohibition of alcohol under the Eight-
eenth Amendment demonstrated.
120. Libertarians recognize that autonomy is limited to acts that do not
harm others. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 13 (Cambridge University
Press 1989) (1859) ("[T]he only purpose for which power can be rightfully exer-
cised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent
harm to others.").
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the premise that many of the factors that differentiate adolescent
decisionmaking are developmental in nature and transient in du-
ration.' 2 ' The autonomy interest protected under informed con-
sent doctrine is the interest of individual decisionmakers in
making choices that reflect their subjective values. Paternalistic
policy does not presume that adolescents' costly choices reflect
idiosyncratic personal values or traits, but rather the influence of
common age-linked characteristics which predictably will change.
If this is so, then the autonomy claim seems less compelling for
adolescents than for adults. For example, an adult who makes
choices that reflect a preference for immediate gratification is re-
vealing subjective personal preferences. If adolescents, in gen-
eral, are more inclined than are adults to make choices that
emphasize short-term over long-term effects, something other
than idiosyncratic personal preference is at work. 122 Moreover, if
the adolescent predictably will become an adult with different val-
ues and preferences from his or her youthful self, then that adult
arguably should not be burdened by the detrimental effects of his
or her earlier immature judgment. 23
121. For a discussion of weak paternalism in this context, see infra notes
122-23 and accompanying text.
122. It is possible to characterize the factors that influence adolescent deci-
sionmaking as analogous to preferences that are associated with other groups, a
characterization that challenges the conclusion that autonomy interests are not
implicated. For example, elderly people (or Italians) may categorically have dif-
ferent tastes in some matters than the norm. Restrictions based on such differ-
ences would not be acceptable, even if the preferences resulted in health
threatening choices. To the extent that adolescent differences can be linked to
developmental change toward maturity, they can be distinguished from many
preferences of this type. To be sure, the line may be fine. For example, it might
be questioned whether the distaste of elderly people for loud music is not in
some sense "developmental." Nonetheless, the importance of peer approval in
adolescence seems to influence decisionmaking in a way that is linked to social
development and that predictably will decrease. We may be more comfortable
responding to such influences in evaluating competence if we can predict that
most adolescent decisionmakers will weigh a given factor differently in the
future.
123. Moral philosophers have struggled with the impact on personal re-
sponsibility and commitment of the fact that personal identity can change over
time. Although the focus of philosophical debate on this issue has been on
change over the course of a lifetime, the evolution of personal identity in adoles-
cence presents the issue more clearly. Derek Parfit has posited that under a
"complex view" of personal identity, the substantial change in an individual's
values, preferences and goals over time could support an argument that the per-
son's identity has changed to the extent that he or she has become a different
self, who should not be bound by the decisions, commitments and acts of his or
her earlier self. Derek Parfit, Later Selves and Moral Principles, in PHILOSOPHY AND
PERSONAL RELATIONS 137, 138-42 (Alan Montefiore ed., 1973). For an applica-
tion of this idea to decisionmaking about marriage, see Elizabeth S. Scott, Ra-
tional Decisionmaking About Marriage and Divorce, 76 VA. L. REV. 9, 58-62 (1990).
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The case for categorical exclusion ofjudgment factors from a
model of adolescent decisionmaking capability rests on other ob-
jections, however. First, the task of constructing measures of
decisionmaking that incorporate judgment is formidable. It is
surely easier to work within the informed consent framework with
its established and, by comparison, simpler structure. Moreover,
the inherently value-laden character of imposing an external
norm of good and poor judgment is troublesome in itself, partic-
ularly when it serves as the basis for legal restriction of self-re-
garding actions. Existing legal doctrine that attempts to evaluate
judgment reveals the susceptibility of this inquiry to interpreter
bias. For example, judges called upon to apply the mature minor
requirement under abortion statutes have often done so in ways
that reveal more about their attitude toward abortion, teenage sex
or the burdens of teen pregnancy than any thoughtful effort to
analyze maturity of judgment.12 4 A conclusion that a particular
outcome represents bad judgment in essence substitutes the val-
ues of another decisionmaker or of society for the values of the
person most affected by the decision.
Despite these objections, exploring aspects of adolescent
124. See, e.g., H. B. v. Wilkinson, 639 F. Supp. 952, 955, 957-58 (D. Utah
1986) (finding 17-year-old minor to be immature because she demonstrated un-
realistic judgment and perspective in relying upon advice of teenagers, expect-
ing to conceal from her parents any medical complications arising from
abortion, dismissing possibility of post-abortion depression, failing to use con-
traceptives and exhibiting "cavalier attitude" toward ease of abortion; finding of
immaturity made despite minor's advanced age, high scholastic average in high
school, college plans and family's opposition to abortion); Matter of T.H., 484
N.E.2d 568, 570-71 (Ind. 1985) (refusing to allow 14-year-old to terminate her
pregnancy, although she testified as to her reasons for wanting abortion and her
foster mother and social worker testified that they thought she was mature
enough to make her own decision); In re T.P., 475 N.E.2d 312, 315 (Ind. 1985)
(refusing to allow 16-year-old minor to terminate pregnancy; requested abortion
would have been second abortion within seven months); In re Jane Doe 1, 566
N.E.2d 1181, 1182, 1184-86 (Ohio 1990) (divided appellate court upholding
trial court's finding that 17-year-old minor was not sufficiently mature to consent
to abortion, despite expert testimony supporting her competence and dissent's
call for objective test based on specific factors, in part because requested abor-
tion would have been her second within one year and pregnancies were result of
intercourse with two different men); see also Robert H. Mnookin, Bellotti v.
Baird: A Hard Case, in IN THE INTEREST OF CHILDREN: ADVOCACY, LAw REFORM &
PUBLIC POLICY 149, 239-40 (Robert H. Mnookin ed., 1985). Mnookin and Vir-
ginia Cartoof's studies revealed that every pregnant minor who sought judicial
authorization for an abortion between April 1981 and February 1983 in Massa-
chusetts obtained judicial authorization. Id. at 239. Mnookin asserts that judges
granted approval because "the superior court judges realize that it would be
impossible as a legal proposition to justify a finding that a pregnant minor was
too immature to decide whether to have an abortion for herself, but that it was
in her best interests to bear the child." Id. at 240.
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decisionmaking related to judgment and considering their rele-
vance to legal policy is a worthwhile undertaking. This response
is largely pragmatic. The empirical assumption that minors' judg-
ment is poorer than adults' is the core of the paternalistic frame-
work that continues to define legal policy toward minors. This
assumption is often explicitly invoked when courts uphold legisla-
tive restrictions on such issues as adolescent abortion. 25 For the
most part this assumption is currently grounded in intuition,
which may be crude, but is nonetheless quite persistent. Arguing
that judgment should not count seems unlikely to alter the intui-
tion. The important and difficult question is not whether judg-
ment should be excluded in principle from an analysis of
adolescent competence. Rather, we should analyze the compo-
nents ofjudgment that are relevant in different decision contexts,
chart the similarities and differences between adolescents and
adults and analyze the relevance to legal policy. A more precise
and empirically based understanding of the amorphous concept
of judgment may either reinforce or undermine the premises of
the paternalistic framework, depending on the context. In any
event, a more empirical and less intuitive foundation for legal pol-
icy would be an advance.
III. JUDGMENT AND ADOLESCENT DECISIONMAKING
In this Part, I explore how the framework for comparing ado-
lescent and adult decisionmaking could be expanded beyond the
constrictions imposed by informed consent doctrine, so as to in-
corporate and permit the evaluation ofjudgment. First, I sketch
several characteristics associated with adolescence that, in some
contexts, might be relevant to assessing judgment as a dimension
of decisionmaking. 12 6 Using a standard model of rational deci-
sionmaking, I then demonstrate, as precisely as possible, how ad-
olescents potentially could be capable of understanding relevant
information and making decisions through a rational process, and
yet systematically differ from adults in important ways that
125. The United States Supreme Court has often described the immaturity
of youthful judgment as the justification for parental authority and paternalistic
oversight. For a discussion of this issue, see supra note 112 and accompanying
text.
126. For example, it is commonly believed that adolescents differ from
adults in breadth of experience, in attitude toward risk, in impulsiveness, in the
weight attached to short-term versus long-term consequences and in the impor-
tance attached to personal appearance and to peer influence. For a discussion of
these issues, see infra notes 127-42 and accompanying text.
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would not be captured by an analysis in the informed consent
framework.
A. Adolescent Development and Decisionmaking
In general, adolescents are presumed to be less independent
in their decisionmaking than adults, and to be subject to the influ-
ence of both parents and peers. Although, compared to younger
children, adolescents have achieved greater autonomy in relation
to their parents, tentative evidence suggests that they are more
subject to parental influence than are young adults. 127 A more
pressing concern for paternalists is that adolescents have a
greater inclination to respond to peer influence than do adults.
This tendency reflects the importance of horizontal peer relation-
ships during adolescence to the formation of personal identity, '2 8
and, as such, is a part of emotional and social development. Peer
influence operates through two processes: social comparison and
conformity. 129 Through social comparison, adolescents use
others' behavior as a measure of their own.' 30 Social conformity
leads adolescents to adapt their behavior and attitudes to those of
their peers.' 3 ' The importance of peer influence to adolescent
127. Scherer, supra note 84, at 442-46. Scherer's research suggests that ad-
olescents are more responsive than young adults to parental influence in making
some important medical decisions, although no clear pattern of influence was
revealed, and on more trivial decisions (removal of a wart) young adults were
more responsive to parental opinion. Id. at 442-43.
The influence of others on decisionmaking implicates the psychological
constructs of conformity, compliance and reactance. Scherer & Reppucci, supra
note 84, at 125-27. Conformity involves acceptance of and effort to mirror so-
cial norms, a response that is most pronounced in early adolescence. Id. at 125.
Compliance relates to obedience and acquiescence to others. Id. Reactance is,
in essence, "anti-conformity," behavior that is oppositional to attempted social
influence. Id. at 125-26. There is little concrete evidence that adolescents are
inclined to resist parental influence. Scherer, supra note 84, at 444 (citing Grisso
& Vierling, supra note 5).
128. See ERIK H. ERIKSON, IDENTITY: YOUTH AND CRISIS 45-53 (1968). Erik-
son described the importance of peer group relations in the formation of per-
sonal identity. Id. Peer influence can be either informational or normative.
Adolescents learn attitudes, behaviors and values from peers. They also feel
pressure to behave as others do. See NORMAN SPRINTHALL & W. ANDREW COL-
LINS, ADOLESCENT PSYCHOLOGY 286-95 (2d ed. 1988).
129. See SPRINTHALL & COLLINS, supra note 128, at 286-95.
130. Id. at 287. Adults and younger children engage in social comparison
as well, but the process is more important in adolescence. Id.
131. Id. at 288. Studies of social conformity provide dramatic evidence of
the extent to which adolescents are influenced by peer opinion. Philip Costanzo
asked 490 subjects to describe which of three straight lines was the same as a
comparison line. Phillip R. Costanzo, Conformity Developments as a Function of Self
Blame, 14J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 366, 369-72 (1970). Tested in groups
of four, but seated in individual booths, subjects were told that indicator lights
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decisionmaking could be relevant in two ways. In some contexts,
adolescents might be more vulnerable to direct peer pressure in
making choices. More indirectly, adolescent desire for peer ap-
proval may affect decisionmaking without any coercion. 32 For
example, an adolescent might reject a particular outcome because
he or she believes that his or her peers will disapprove.
Adolescents in general also demonstrate a heightened con-
cern for personal appearance, a trait that is linked to the dramatic
physical changes that occur during this developmental stage.'3 3
This concern is interwoven with the focus on peer approval and is
an important dimension of social and emotional development.
The importance of body image might affect the value attached to
different consequences in making decisions. For example, ado-
lescents are less willing than adults to accept treatment with dis-
figuring side effects.' 3 4
revealed other subjects' responses. Id. Actually, in 15 of 20 trials, the lights
indicated identical erroneous responses. Id. Adolescents were significantly
more likely than were either younger children (ages 7-8) or adults (ages 19 to
21) to conform to erroneous responses. Id.; see also SPRINTHALL & COLLINS, supra
note 128, at 290-91.
132. The Costanzo study reveals how powerful this indirect influence can
be. See Costanzo, supra note 131.
133. Child development experts agree that physical change during adoles-
cence has an important effect on psychological development. Self-image and
self-esteem are linked to the individual adolescent's subjective reaction to the
change and the reaction of others. See Guy J. MANASTER, ADOLESCENT DEVELOP-
MENT: A PSYCHOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION 16, 26-29 (1989) (discussing
psychosocial effects of early and late maturation); SPRINTHALL & COLLINS, supra
note 128, at 56-57 (discussing effect of pubertal changes on self-concept). Ado-
lescents share "an intense psychological need for physical sameness with their
peers." B. GERALDINE LAMBERT ET AL., ADOLESCENCE: TRANSITION FROM CHILD-
HOOD TO MATURITY 107-09 (1972); see also A. Peterson & B. Taylor, The Biological
Approach to Adolescence, in HANDBOOK OF ADOLESCENT PSYCHOLOGY 147 (J. Adel-
son ed., 1980).
134. For an example of when adolescents are less willing to undergo disfig-
uring treatment, see supra note 82. See also Barbara A. Cromer & Kenneth J.
Tarnowski, Noncompliance in Adolescence: A Review, 10J. DEV. & BEHAV. PEDIATRICS
207, 211-12 (1989) (finding in study that poor body image was related to non-
compliance with back exercises and with wearing braces for scoliotic condition).
One study of renal transplant patients found several adolescent girls who re-
ported "that their appearance was so repugnant to them and caused such
problems in their social relationships that 'it was not worth it' " to adhere to 'a
regimen of immunosuppressive medication, despite the fact that non-compli-
ance was life threatening. Barbara M. Korsch et al., Noncompliance in Children with
Renal Transplants, 61 PEDIATRICS 872, 874 (1978). Another study found small
but statistically significant differences between 14 year olds and adults in choos-
ing treatment options for epilepsy; the authors related these findings "to the
concerns of early adolescents about body image and physical attractiveness" be-
cause the rejected medication was described as sometimes leading to periodon-
tal problems and excess growth of body hair. Weithorn & Campbell, supra note
60, at 1596.
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Youthful decisionmakers are also presumed to be more im-
pulsive in their behavior than adults.' 3 5 This tendency, if estab-
lished, might affect decisionmaking competence, if impulsiveness
disables the young individual from considering alternatives or
weighing and comparing consequences according to his or her
subjective utility. More likely, impulsiveness might simply affect
the care with which actual decisions are made, even though it
might not impair theoretical competence to follow a rational
process.
Adolescents seem to differ from adults in their perception of
and attitude toward risk and in their perspective on time.' 3 6 Dif-
ferent attitudes toward risk might result from dissimilar risk pref-
erences. Adolescents are believed to be less risk averse than
135. Norman A. Sprinthall & R. L. Mosher, Studies of Adolescents in the Secon-
dary Schools (1969), cited in SPRINTHALL & COLLINS, supra note 128, at 464-65.
These authors conducted research in secondary schools to assess the decision-
making process of high school juniors with respect to career objectives. Id.
They found that almost two-thirds of teenagers failed to use rational planning
and instead chose blindly and impulsively, left the decision to fate or sought
advice from others. Id.
136. William Gardner and colleagues have conducted several studies and
written thoughtfully on adolescent attitudes toward risk. See Gardner, supra note
95; Gardner et al., Developmental Change in Decision-Making, supra note 95;
William Gardner &Janna Herman, Adolescents 'AIDS Risk Taking: A Rational Choice
Perspective, in 50 NEW DIRECTIONS FOR CHILD DEV. 17 (1990); Tester et al., supra
note 95. It is well established that adolescents engage in "risky" behavior-
behavior which from an adult perspective presents greater risk of loss than pos-
sibility of gain. See Gardner & Herman, supra, at 17; cf. Lita Furby & Ruth Beyth-
Marom, RISK TAKING IN ADOLESCENCE: A DECISION-MAKING PERSPECTIVE 28
(Carnegie Council on Adolescent Development Working Papers, 1990) (analyz-
ing risk taking behavior as rational decisionmaking). Furby and Beyth-Marom
offer a comprehensive description of the relevant research literature. Id. at 19-
25.
Risk taking behavior is closely linked to perspective on time. Many re-
searchers have studied the changes in temporal perspective that occur during
adolescence. A. L. Greene, in an article that provides a comprehensive descrip-
tion of existing studies, has described three differences between younger chil-
dren and adolescents. Adolescents demonstrate greater depth and extension of
temporal perspective, have a more complex set of behavioral expectations, and
show more planning, organization and realism in describing future aspirations.
A.L. Greene, Future-Time Perspective in Adolescence: The Present of Things Future Revis-
ited, 15J. YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE 99, 100 (1986). Changes in temporal perspec-
tive continue to occur through late adolescence. See F. Monks, Future Time
Perspective in Adolescence, 11 HUM. DEV. 107, 111 (1968) (studing essays written by
14 to 21 year olds showed close relationship between age and personal attitude
toward future); see also Thomas Cottle et al., Adolescent Perceptions of Time: The Effect
of Age, Sex, and Social Class, 37 PERSONALITY 636 (1969) (noting that young adoles-
cents are preoccupied with present; sense of extended future not yet formed).
Furby and Beyth-Marom express skepticism about whether research has demon-
strated that adolescents possess stronger positive time preferences than do
adults. Furby & Beyth-Marom, supra, at 32.
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adults. 13 7 Compared to adults, adolescents appear to focus less
on protection against losses than on opportunities for gains in
making choices. 13 8 Differences in risk perception also have been
observed. Perhaps because they have less experience than adults,
adolescents may sometimes be unaware of risks that adults per-
ceive, or they may calculate the probability or magnitude of a
given risk differently.139
Attitude toward risk also has a temporal component. In gen-
eral, adolescents seem to discount the future more than adults
and to weigh more heavily the short-term consequences of deci-
sions-both risks and benefits. This tendency contributes to risky
behavior in some settings. 140 William Gardner and Janna Her-
man hypothesize that this tendency may be linked to the greater
uncertainty that young people may feel about their own futures,
an uncertainty that might make short-term consequences seem
137. See Gardner & Herman, supra note 136, at 23-28.
138. Differences in risk preference are reflected in the extent to which
avoiding loss (or exploiting the potential for gain) is important in reaching deci-
sion outcomes. Lola Lopes, Between Hope and Fear. The Psychology of Risk, 20 ADV.
IN EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 255, 275 (1987); see also Furby & Beyth-Marom,
supra note 136, at 56-59 (presenting hypotheses as to how differences in risk
preference described by Lopes, supra, may lead to differences in risk taking);
Gardner & Herman, supra note 136 (finding in study that older children and girls
favor choices that reduce exposure to large losses).
139. The belief that adolescents sometimes do not perceive risks or calcu-
late them accurately is linked to a view that youth is associated with a sense of
invulnerability (unrealistic confidence in personal safety). See Furby & Beyth-
Marom, supra note 136, at 33. Furby and Beyth-Marom speculate that adoles-
cents' more limited experience leads to the tendency to disregard the possibility
of negative outcomes. Id. This speculation is supported by some research find-
ings. See Catherine C. Lewis, How Adolescents Approach Decisions: Changes over
Grades Seven to Twelve and Policy Implications, 52 CHILD DEV. 538, 541 (1981) (con-
cluding that compared to younger subjects, 18 year olds more likely to sponta-
neously mention risks of cosmetic surgery); Charles E. Phelps, Risk and Perceived
Risk of Drunk Driving Among Young Drivers, 6J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MCMT. 708, 710-
11 (1987) (finding that young drivers greatly underestimate risk of accident as-
sociated with drinking six alcoholic drinks).
Interestingly, mid-adolescents seem to have poorer perception of the risks
of cigarette smoking than either younger children or older teens. See Kathryn
Urberg & Rochelle Robbins, Perceived Vulnerability in Adolescents to the Health Conse-
quences of Cigarette Smoking, 13 PREVENTIVE MED. 367, 373-74 (1984) (finding in
cross-sectional study that perception of risks of smoking dropped to low point at
age fourteen and then rose slowly during high school).
140. See Gardner & Herman, supra note 136, at 25-26. As Gardner and Her-
man point out, strong positive time preferences (focus on immediate conse-
quences) can increase risk taking behavior because only immediate negative
consequences will be taken into account and future harmful consequences will
be discounted. Id. Adolescent propensity to engage in risky sexual behavior,
discounting the risk of AIDS (or pregnancy), can be explained in these terms.
Id.
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more salient in an evaluation of different options. 14' This ten-
dency also may reflect the reality that adolescents have had less
experience. An adolescent may find it more difficult than an adult
to contemplate the meaning of a consequence that will be realized
five to ten years in the future, because such a time span is not
easily made relevant to adolescent experience. 42
B. Judgment in a Rational Decisionmaking Model
In order to examine how adolescent and adult decisionmak-
ing might be compared in ways that have been ignored or ob-
scured under the formal informed consent framework, I develop a
step-by-step analysis using a standard "model" of rational deci-
sionmaking. Lita Furby and Ruth Beyth-Marom describe such a
decisionmaking model that would include the following steps:
(1) identifying the possible alternative outcomes; (2) identifying
the consequences that may follow from each outcome; (3) assess-
ing the desirability and the probability of each consequence; and
(4) using this information to make a decision that maximizes
one's utility. 143 The requirements for competent decisionmaking
under an informed consent framework conform to this prescrip-
tion.' 44 Examination of the process of making decisions under
this model also permits a more expansive inquiry into dimensions
of decisionmaking relevant to the comparison of adult and ado-
lescent judgment.
1. Differences in Use of Information
The first stages of decisionmaking involve the gathering and
organization of information. Dissimilarity in the use of informa-
141. See id. at 23-27.
142. In general, the fact that adolescents have less experience than adults
can influence decisionmaking in tangible and intangible ways. Although the rel-
ative inexperience of adolescents is not contested as a general proposition, the
relevance of this fact to decisionmaking and to judgment has not been rigor-
ously analyzed. Thus, traditionalists frequently make rhetorical claims about the
detrimental impact of adolescents' more limited experience on their decision-
making in support of restrictive policies while advocates routinely dismiss these
claims.
143. Furby & Beyth-Marom, supra note 136, at 4-5. The structure of Furby
and Beyth-Marom's analysis of decisionmaking has influenced my approach to
this section significantly, although I draw different inferences from the analysis.
144. The competent patient is capable of understanding the options for
treatment (including no treatment) and the consequences of each option. The
patient should be able to evaluate the magnitude and probability of the risks and
benefits of each option and then to make a choice by using this information in a
rational manner.
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tion between adolescents and adults would exist if minors consid-
ered a different range of options in thinking about their available
choices, or if they identified different consequences in evaluating
and comparing alternatives. 45 Individuals may vary in at least
two ways in the use of information. First, they may vary in the
extent to which they have relevant knowledge on which to draw in
making a decision, and second, they may differ in the amount or
type of information that they actually use.
The use of information by adult decisionmakers has been the
focus of a great deal of research in cognitive psychology.' 46
Adults are not by any means optimal rational decisionmakers. 147
Through the use of various strategies or heuristics, deci-
sionmakers organize large amounts of information in order to fo-
cus on salient data. These strategies, although usually helpful,
can distort the type of information that is considered and thus can
bias decisionmaking. 148 What is of interest, therefore, is not
whether minors fail to consider important information, but how
they compare to adults in this regard. Ultimately, the evaluation
of whether disparities in the use of information signify differences
in the quality of decisionmaking requires an assessment about the
importance of the information which is ignored or treated differ-
ently in a given context.
The research comparing adolescents and adults in their use
of information has produced ambiguous results. Adolescents are
similar to adults in their cognitive capacity for information
processing, 49 and, in some contexts, are also similar to adults in
the use of information that is provided to them.' 50 Research find-
ings do indicate, however, that in some contexts, adolescent deci-
sionmakers are aware of and use less information than adults.
145. See Furby & Beyth-Marom, supra note 136, at 9-10. For example, fewer
teenagers than adults whose families seek psychiatric hospitalization might be
aware of the alternative of refusing hospitalization.
146. For a sampling of research and positive theory, see JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS & BIASES (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982).
147. See id.; Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames,
39 AMER. PSYCHOLOGIST 341 (1984).
148. Kahnemann & Tversky, supra note 147, at 350.
149. See Gardner et al., supra note 6 at 897-98 (citing studies suggesting that
adolescents' cognitive capacity for information processing is similar to that of
adults).
150. Weithorn and Campbell's research indicates that adolescents who
were provided with information about treatment alternatives used the informa-
tion similar in a manner to that of adults. Weithorn & Campbell, supra note 60,
at 1596. But see id. (noting that despite "generally equivalent" performance,
small but statistically significant differences were found).
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For example, some studies of adolescent use of contraceptives
suggest that ignorance about the risk of pregnancy is more wide-
spread among teens than adults. 15' Maya Tester and her col-
leagues, in a study that tested the use of information about loss,
gain and probability in making choices, found that adults used
more information than children or adolescents.' 52 In particular,
this and other studies have found that older decisionmakers pay
more attention to loss in making decisions than do children and
adolescents. 53 Catherine Lewis found that, compared to fifteen
year olds, eighteen year olds spontaneously mentioned a broader
array of risks of cosmetic surgery. 54 Valerie Reyna and col-
leagues found that adolescents were more influenced by single
case histories in estimating probabilities than were adults. 55
Taken together, these studies indicate that, in some contexts,
adolescents differ from adults in the way they use information in
making choices.' 56 However, few generalizations seem to hold
and the sources of difference are quite complex; differences in
experience, knowledge, and attitude toward and perception of
risk may all be interwoven.
151. See Diane M. Morrison, Adolescent Contraceptive Behavior: A Review, 98
PSYCHOL. BULL. 538, 539-41 (1985) ("Studies of high school-age adolescents
suggest ... that many have only limited, and often faulty, information.").
152. Tester et al., supra note 95 at 4-5, 7-9. The study tested the use of
information by subjects directed to make choices in a computer gambling game.
Subjects included children (ages 7-9), adolescents (ages 11-13) and adults (ages
19 and over). Id. at 3.
153. Id. at 5. Gardner and his colleagues found that children and adoles-
cents tended to pay more attention to potential gains than losses, while adults
gave equal weight to both dimensions. Gardner et al., Developmental Change in
Decisionmaking, supra note 95, at 9-10.
154. Lewis, supra note 139, at 541. Because risks were not revealed to the
subjects, the differences between adolescents and adults in mentioning risks may
be attributable to the different information bases each group had available in
making choices.
155. See Furby & Beyth-Marom, supra note 136, at 18 (citing Valerie F.
Reyna et al., Attitude Change in Adults and Adolescents: Moderation Versus
Polarization, Statistics Versus Case Histories (1987) (unpublished manuscript)).
156. In a review of the research, commentator Harmoni and collegeagues
reported that older adolescents are better able to think of options, identify risks
and benefits and assess the credibility of information than are younger adoles-
cents (ages 12-14). R. Harmoni et al., Adolescent Decisionmaking: The Devel-
opment of Competence (1987) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Flinders
University of South Australia), cited in Furby & Beyth-Marom, supra note 136, at
17-18. But see John A. Ross, The Measurement of Student Progress in a Decisionmaking
Approach to Values Education, 27 ALBERTAJ. EDUC. RES. 1 (1981), cited in Furby &
Beyth-Marom, supra note 136, at 17-18 (finding few differences among seventh
to tenth graders in identifying alternatives and summarizing information about
criteria and suggesting that decisionmaking growth takes place only in early ele-
mentary and late secondary grades).
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2. Value Differences
A different type of variation could emerge in the next stage of
decisionmaking, in which the individual attaches subjective value
to the perceived consequences of each alternative. In undertak-
ing a cost-benefit calculus, minors, subject to developmental in-
fluences, might weigh a particular cost or benefit differently than
adults (or view as a benefit what adults would count as a cost).
For example, because adolescents are relatively more concerned
about personal appearance than are adults, the fact that a medica-
tion involves a twenty percent risk of causing unsightly hair
growth might be weighed more heavily as a cost of that option by
teenagers than by adults. 157 Similarly, it might be a more impor-
tant benefit to adolescents than to adults that one choice is likely
to result in greater peer approval than another. 158 Finally, the
fact that adolescents tend to discount the future more than adults
could influence the way some costs and benefits are weighed. 15 9
Thus, an adolescent with scoliosis who is deciding whether to
consent to wearing a brace to correct her spinal curvature might
weigh the anticipated short-term embarrassment more heavily
than an adult and the prospect of a straight spine in the distant
future less heavily.
Adolescents and adults might also calculate the probability of
a given consequence differently. Adolescents are more likely than
adults to engage in risky behavior 160 perhaps, in part, because it
seems less risky to them than it would to to adults. Although this
could be due to differences in accessible information, 161 dissimi-
157. Lois Weithorn found that adolescents were less likely than adults to
choose one alternative treatment for epilepsy that occasionally could cause peri-
odontal problems or excess growth of body hair. Weithorn & Campbell, supra
note 60, at 1596. Research on adolescent patients with kidney transplants re-
vealed that repulsion at the side effects of immunosuppressive medication (hir-
sutism and facial disfigurement) was associated with noncompliance, despite an
intellectual understanding of the life-threatening potential of this choice.
Korsch et al., supra note 134, at 874, cited in Cromer & Tarnowski, supra note 134,
at 209 n.73.
158. See LAMBERT ET AL., supra note 134, at 107-09.
159. Gardner, A Life-Span Theory of Risk-taking, supra note 95, at 9-11.
160. "Risky behavior," of course, is defined objectively by adult standards,
and includes behavior that puts health, welfare and life at risk. Substance abuse,
auto accidents and unprotected sexual activity are more commonly associated
with youth. See Furby & Beyth-Marom, supra note 136, at 19 (citing studies con-
cerning risky behavior by youths); see also RISKING THE FUTURE: ADOLESCENT SEX-
UALITY, PREGNANCY, AND CHILDBEARING 101 (Cheryl D. Hayes ed., 1987) (same);
Gardner, A Life Span Theory of Risk Taking, supra note 95 (same).
161. See Lewis, supra note 139, at 541 (finding that 42% of twelfth graders
spontaneously mention future consequences of cosmetic surgery and experi-
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lar attitudes toward risk itself and temporal discount rates can
also play a part. For example, adolescents and adults might both
think drug experimentation carries a risk of addiction, and sexual
experimentation poses a risk of pregnancy and AIDS. The two
groups may assess differently, however, the probability that the
negative consequences will occur. Alternatively, minors and
adults might concur that a given option carries a certain percent-
age of risk of a particular bad consequence, but due to dissimilar
risk preferences, differ on whether that risk is prohibitive or
acceptable.162
Substantial evidence supports the claim that youthful deci-
sionmakers sometimes subjectively value consequences in ways
that distinguish them from adults.' 63 These differences reflect
the influence on the risk-benefit calculus (and thus on the out-
comes reached) of developmental factors such as susceptibility to
peer influence, 64 concern about personal appearance,165 attitude
toward risk and perspective on time. 166 The substantial body of
research on treatment compliance in patients with chronic illness
mental acne treatment, while only 25% of tenth graders and 11% of seventh and
eighth graders mention these consequences); Phelps, supra note 139, at 710-11
(noting that adolescents underestimate risk of accident associated with
drinking).
162. One whose predisposition is to avoid large losses is likely to weigh a
given risk more heavily than is one who is inclined to exploit the potential for
gain. For a further discussion on differing attitudes toward risk, see supra notes
136-39 and accompanying text. This is not the same issue as is presented by the
hair loss example above. For example, presumably, most people would agree
that contracting AIDS is very undesirable. However, decisionmakers might vary
in their response to the information that a contemplated choice holds a one per-
cent risk of contracting AIDS. An alternative (not inconsistent) explanation is
based on differences in time preference. A decisionmaker willing to risk AIDS
may be discounting the future harm represented by the risk in favor of immedi-
ate benefit. Gardner & Herman, supra note 136, at 25-26. This response is di-
rectly linked to time preferences. Id. at 25; see also Furby & Beyth-Marom, supra
note 136, at 31-33 (discussing empirical studies on developmental differences in
temporal perspective).
163. Again, it should be emphasized that no evidence suggests that adults
perform optimally in their perception or assessment of risks. For a discussion
emphasizing this point, see supra notes 147-48 and accompanying text.
164. See Costanzo, supra note 131, at 372 (demonstrating through study
that "suggestibility [sic] of child to peer influence increases with age into pubes-
cence," and then declines with increasing age).
165. For a discussion of the impact that concerns about personal appear-
ance may have on the risk-benefit calculus, see supra notes 133-34 and accompa-
nying text.
166. See Furby & Beyth-Marom, supra note 136, at 33 ("[I]t may be that
adolescents judge some negative consequences in the distant future to be of
lower probability than do adults or to be of less importance than adults do.");
Gardner et al., A Life Span-Theory of Risk-taking, supra note 95, at 9-11; see also
Gardner & Herman, supra note 136, at 25 ("[A] thirty-five-year-old can predict
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suggests that these developmental factors in combination may
contribute to greater non-compliance among adolescents than
adults.1 67 In general, when adolescents choose different out-
comes than adults, it may reflect a risk-benefit calculus informed
by different values and preferences.
C. The Implications of Informational and Value Differences
As discussed in the previous subsection, the potential differ-
ences that might lead youths and adults to make dissimilar
choices appear to fall into two categories: differences in the range
and type of information possessed or used and differences in sub-
jective value attached to various risks and benefits.
1. Informational Differences
If adolescents depart from adult norms in the character or
the circumstances of his or her life at age forty-five far better than a fifteen-year-
old can predict his or her future at age twenty-five.").
167. Barbara Cromer and Kenneth Tarnowski reviewed several develop-
mental issues that relate to adolescents' "willingness and ability to comply with
medical advice": cognitive ability, effective individuation and separation from
the family, and consolidation of body image. See Cromer & Tarnowski, supra
note 134, at 207, 211-12. Robert Blum noted: "Among clinicians, adolescents
have an image of being chronic noncompliers with therapeutic regimens. Often
factors such as emerging independence from family, rebelliousness, and peer
pressure are blamed." Robert W. Blum, Compliance with Therapeutic Regimens
Among Children & Youth, in CHRONIC ILLNESS & DISABILITIES IN CHILDHOOD &
ADOLESCENCE 143, 143 (Robert W. Blum ed., 1984).
Adolescents tend to engage in "risky" sexual activity more than adults, de-
spite similar information about risks. S. M. Kegeles et al., Adolescents & Con-
doms: Associations of Beliefs with Intentions to Use (August 1988)
(unpublished paper presented at annual convention of American Psychological
Association, Atlanta, GA), cited in Furby & Beyth-Marom, supra note 136, at 11-
12 (finding that "14-19 year olds' intention to use condoms was not related to
their beliefs about degree to which condoms prevent venereal disease or preg-
nancy"); see also MELVIN ZELNICK ET AL., SEX & PREGNANCY IN ADOLESCENCE 115
(1981) (noting that nearly one-third of sexually active 15- to 19-year-old women
never used contraceptives); Karl E. Bauman &J. Richard Udry, Subjective Expected
Utility and Adolescent Sexual Behavior, 16 ADOLESCENCE 527, 527-31 (1981) (finding
in study of 307 junior high school students that adolescents with higher subjec-
tive expected utility for intimate behavior, i.e., those believing positive conse-
quences outweighed negative, had had sexual intercourse); Marcia A. Gilbert et
al., A Panel Study of Subjective Expected Utility for Adolescent Sexual Behavior, 16 J.
APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 745, 745-46 (1986) (studying role of consequence evalu-
ation in decisions regarding sexual intercourse). This seems to reflect differ-
ences in risk preference and also in the weight attached to long-term and short-
term consequences. See Furby & Beyth-Marom, supra note 136, at 32-33 (dis-
cussing adolescents' tendency to discount negative consequences in distant fu-
ture); Gardner & Herman, supra note 136, at 25 (describing how strong positive
time preference can "desensitize people to the costs of risk taking" concerning
sexual activity).
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amount of information upon which they base decisions, the dis-
crepancy could reflect either differences in awareness of relevant
facts or in the use of information. 68 Differences of this kind
might not be revealed when competence is formally evaluated
under an informed consent framework because the doctrine (and
thus the research) directs disclosure of all relevant information.
Thus, a person might perform competently when formally evalu-
ated for informed consent purposes, and yet lack information
necessary to make informed choices in less structured settings. 69
Informational deficiencies will reflect upon competence under the
formal informed consent framework if the decisionmaker disre-
gards relevant information that is provided, but not if, absent dis-
closure, he or she simply lacks the range of information necessary
to make the decision or fails to draw on relevant knowledge. 70
Even in informal settings, of course, adequate decisions can
be based on incomplete or inaccurate data.' 7' In some circum-
stances, however, we are likely to conclude that the decisionmaker
who considers a narrower range of options and consequences
than the norm, although capable of understanding and of engag-
ing in a rational process, is revealing inferior judgment. For ex-
ample, consider the individual who, having driven to a party,
decides whether to drink or not by weighing the good time to-
night against the headache tomorrow. The process by which the
person makes a decision might well follow the steps of a rational
decisionmaking model. Nonetheless, if the person fails to con-
sider the effect of drinking on his driving (although the person
may be capable of understanding that effect), we would consider
that omission to reveal deficiencies in judgment. The conse-
quence which has not occurred to the person is an important one,
and thus his or her cost-benefit calculus, although rational, is not
168. These differences, I have argued, could affect the range of options and
consequences considered or the level of risk perceived.
169. Further, the extent to which decisionmakers use information that is
provided might vary in laboratory and natural settings; to date, most compara-
tive data comes from laboratory research, and involves reconstructive reports by
subjects. At this point, we have little data about the extent to which information
is actually used by adults and minors outside the laboratory.
170. I would argue that the failure to use information formally presented in
the decision context is different from the failure to recognize the relevance of
information acquired sometime in the past for this decision. For an example of
the latter, see the example in text accompanying notes 171-72 infra.
171. That is to say, the decisionmaker may go through a rational process of
identifying options and consequences and may weigh costs and benefits in
reaching a decision, while using limited, but the most salient, information.
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very satisfactory. 172
If, in some contexts, adolescent decisionmaking reveals more
limited use of important information (or more extensive use of
inaccurate information) than does adult decisionmaking, then our
assessment of comparative decisionmaking capability could be af-
fected.173 A disparity between adults and minors is of more than
theoretical interest when it translates into decisions by minors
that threaten significant harm to the youthful decisionmaker or to
others. For policy purposes, it seems important to know a great
deal more than we do about how adolescents compare with adults
in their use of information in contexts in which they must draw on
their own experience. Certainly, any broad assault on traditional
paternalistic premises is weakened by the current gaps in our
knowledge.
2. Value Differences and the Cost-Benefit Calculus
It would be irrelevant in assessing competence under an in-
formed consent framework (or any standard rational decision-
making model) that adults and minors attach different values to
particular consequences. The cost-benefit calculus under an in-
formed consent framework explicitly measures subjective utility,
the value to the decisionmaker of the potential consequences of each
option. A rational decisionmaker makes the choice that best pro-
motes his or her personal values. 174 The calculus is not measured
against any external standard of reasonableness; what might seem
like an onerous cost of a particular option to one person could
appear trivial to another.
Consider, for example, a young woman deciding whether or
not to consent to a leg amputation for cancer. Assume that her
172. As Richard Bonnie pointed out to me, this deficiency in evaluating
consequences amounts, in part, to a lack of foresight, and thus is analogous to
negligence. Decisionmakers might be described as negligent if they do not fore-
see consequences that the ordinary decisionmaker would foresee. If this is true
of adolescents in some contexts, we would not attach the culpability that negli-
gence connotes, but we might conclude that they are "developmentally
negligent."
173. Even if this is so, it might be often irrelevant to policy concerns; first,
legal decisions often can be formally structured, and second, information defi-
ciencies may only involve peripheral data or innocuous decisions. However, at
some point, the failure to consider important options or consequences and the
distortion of risk might reflect deficiency in decisionmaking capability that is rel-
evant to policy concerns.
174. Thus, Furby & Beyth-Marom describe risky behavior as action or inac-
tion that entails a risk of loss, which is defined in terms of the actor's values.
Furby & Beyth-Marom, supra note 136, at 3.
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chances for long-term survival are ninety percent if she consents.
If she refuses, her condition is terminal; she will live at most three
or four years. In this situation, a rational decisionmaker could
calculate that the costs associated with the loss of her leg (the
long hospitalization, the resulting impairment to her appearance
and mobility and the anticipated impairment to her social rela-
tionships) outweigh the benefit of long-term survival with one leg.
If most people would reach a different outcome, this only reveals
that most people subjectively attach a different value than does
this decisionmaker to long-term survival, on the one hand, and to
hospitalization, personal appearance, mobility and peer relations
on the other. 175 The point is that, if the individual evaluates op-
tions and their consequences, and engages in a cost-benefit
calculus of the type described above, the decisionmaking process
is rational and, by standard measures, competent, even if the out-
come is determined by idiosyncratic values or preferences.
The position that the subjective values of decisionmakers are
irrelevant to the competence of the decision is deeply entrenched,
not only in the legal framework for defining competence, 76 but
also in the perspective of social scientists who study decisionmak-
ing. 177 The study of adolescent risk-taking behavior by Lita Furby
and Ruth Beyth-Marom provides a clear illustration. 78 These
psychologists consider, from a decisionmaking perspective, risky
activities that teens engage in more commonly than adults: sex
without contraceptives, reckless driving and health-threatening
use of drugs and alcohol. The authors argue persuasively that the
adolescent who engages in risk-taking behavior is not necessarily
an irrational sensation seeker who miscalculates risk. Instead, the
adolesant might well be rationally choosing the option that maxi-
mizes his or her subjective utility, and which, therefore, holds less
risk of loss and more potential gain than do the alternative
choices. 179 Because loss and gain are defined according to the
decisionmaker's own values, conduct could well appear unaccept-
ably risky to adults but not to adolescents. Thus, a teen deciding
175. Alternatively, the different outcome might be the result of less pessi-
mistic assessments of certain undetermined probabilities, such as the probability
that peer relations will be damaged.
176. For a discussion of the legal framework defining competence issue, see
supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
177. See Furby & Beyth-Marom, supra note 136, at 9-15, 28, 30-31 (discuss-
ing how differences between adolescent and adult decisionmaking may reflect
differences in values but not differences in competence).
178. Id.
179. Id.
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whether to accept an invitation to join friends in taking drugs
might conclude that the costs of saying "no," in terms of self-
image (who wants to be a geek?) and peer rejection, weigh more
heavily than the risk of addiction or apprehension, and that the
benefit of feeling good and sharing in the group experience is
greater than that of being a clear-headed, law-abiding citizen.
Saying "yes" under these circumstances is simply the rational
cost-avoiding choice and is not risky behavior at all.
This analysis demonstrates the error in considering adoles-
cent legal competence in the constricted framework in which
adult decisionmaking is studied and evaluated. Scientists study-
ing decisionmaking are appropriately reluctant to get involved
with subjecting the values that shape the decision calculus to an
objective normative standard. This neutrality does not (and ar-
guably should not) characterize the response of policymakers and
parents to the choices made by minors. We are quite ready to
conclude that choices that are health-threatening or life-threaten-
ing, or in other ways risk future welfare, are risky choices that re-
flect poor judgment, even if they rationally promote the
decisionmaker's values at the time the decision is made. More-
over, if the values that drive risky choices are associated with
youth, and predictably will change with maturity, then our pater-
nalistic inclination is to protect the young decisionmaker-and
ourselves-from his or her bad judgment. This impulse is not
quelled by the knowledge that, in making the "poor" decision,
the youthful decisionmaker has engaged in a rational process.
The case of the young cancer victim deciding about amputa-
tion is instructive. This is a hard case, because the young woman
is not using poor judgment in the way that a young driver choos-
ing to drive 100 miles per hour clearly is. A mature and thought-
ful adult might reach the same conclusion that the personal cost
of amputation is too great and that a greatly shortened life is pref-
erable. This decision made by an adult would be respected. Can
any different response be justified for minors? If the answer is
"yes," then it is because we have reason to believe that, in many
cases, the values that inform the adolescent choice will change;
that long-term survival will mean more with maturity, and that
personal appearance and fear of peer rejection will be less impor-
tant. If the young person's authority to make this decision is re-
stricted, it is because we are reluctant to allow him or her to
foreclose future choices in a situation in which we suspect that
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developmental influences, and not simply idiosyncratic personal
values, have shaped the decision.
D. Adolescent Judgment: The Implications for Research
Expanding our understanding of children's competence from
the restricted framework of the informed consent model to one
that encompasses judgment also requires expansion of the scope
of empirical investigation of how adolescent decisionmaking com-
pares with that of adults. Because the informed consent model
has become the framework for thinking about children's compe-
tence, some aspects of decisionmaking have not seemed relevant,
and thus, have not received much attention. 180 A richer under-
standing of the decisionmaking capabilities of children and ado-
lescents relative to adults requires both recognizing the
importance of research that has not seemed relevant under the
informed consent framework and pursuing a broader program of
policy-relevant research. Further investigation can inform what is
now a sketchy account of how minors and adults compare in their
use of information, and of how subjective values that drive the
cost-benefit calculus differ at different stages of life.
In comparing adolescent and adult use of information, we
can turn to an impressive body of descriptive theory and labora-
tory research in cognitive and social psychology. Research study-
ing the processes by which adults make judgments under
conditions of uncertainty and comparing human performance
with an objective norm have been useful in understanding how
individuals process and organize information, make predictions
and assess risk. l8 ' Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, for ex-
180. For example, the finding by Weithorn that adolescents more than
adults reject a particular treatment that has a risk of hirsutism is seldom, if ever,
mentioned in reports of Weithorn's research. One might speculate that this is
because this particular finding, which seems to reflect adolescent concern for
personal appearance, is irrelevant under the informed consent framework.
Thus, Gittler, Quick and Saks, in their exhaustive account of research on adoles-
cent decisionmaking competence, describe Weithorn's research in detail but do
not include this finding. See Gittler et al., supra note 5, at 38-40. The extensive
research on treatment noncompliance comparing children, adolescents and
adults has also been largely unnoticed in the law-psychology literature. For a
discussion of this research, see supra note 169 and accompanying text.
181. Three strands of research in the 1950s and 1960s have been the basis
of modern decisionmaking research. One line of experimental research com-
pared human judgment to a statistical norm. See Ward Edwards, Dynamic Decision
Theory and Probabilistic Information Processing, 4 HUM. FACTORS 59 (1962). Other
early research compared statistical prediction with clinical performance. See
PAUL E. MEEHL, CLINICAL VERSUS STATISTICAL PREDICTION: A THEORETICAL
ANALYSIS AND A REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE (1954). The third line studied cogni-
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ample, have drawn on a large body of experimental data in argu-
ing that individuals rely on heuristics, or rules of thumb, as
mechanisms for organizing information, and that distorting biases
can sometimes result.'8 2 Other research explores how the fram-
ing of choices can influence outcomes. 83 Because only a few of
these studies have compared adults and children,R 4 this research
suggests one direction for further inquiry that could enhance our
understanding of the extent to which adolescent and adult deci-
sionmaking are similar.
If it is important for policy purposes to understand more
about adolescent judgment, then the theoretical and research
literature on adolescent cognitive and social development poten-
tially has greater relevance than has previously been acknowl-
tive strategies for simplifying complex judgments. See HERBERT A. SIMON, MOD-
ELS OF MAN: SOCIAL AND RATIONAL (1957). Building on this research, modern
cognitive psychologists have studied the use of judgmental heuristics in assess-
ing probabilities and processing information, and have explored the resulting
cognitive error. See generally JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BI-
ASES, supra note 146 (discussing experimental research and descriptive theories
of cognitive error); RICHARD NISBETr & LEE Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATE-
GIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT (1980) (discussing defects pro-
duced by nature of cognitive structures and processes); Robert P. Abelson &
Ariel Levi, Decisionmaking and Decision Theory, in 1 THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSY-
CHOLOGY 231 (Gardner Lindzey & Elliot Aronson eds., 1985) (reviewing deci-
sion research and theory).
182. See JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS & BIASES, supra note
146. For example, the availability heuristic leads decisionmakers to overvalue
vivid experiential data and discount more abstract information. Id. at 163-68.
Use of the representativeness heuristic causes decisionmakers to focus on case
examples and disregard base rates. Id. at 23-31. Because of anchoring, another
heuristic, individuals can fail to adequately adjust estimates and predictions to
accommodate later-acquired information. Id. at 14-16. The approach of
Kahneman has been subject to criticism in recent years. See Gerd Gigerenzer,
How to Make Cognitive Illusions Disappear: Beyond "Heuristics & Biases, " in 2 EURO-
PEAN REVIEW OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 83 (Wolfgang Stroebe & Miles Hewstone
eds., 1991) (arguing that probabilistic reasoning approach of Kahneman ignores
richness of natural environments and social context of judgment).
183. For example, a lung cancer patient may evaluate treatment informa-
tion differently depending on whether the outcome is described in terms of sur-
vival or mortality. See Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 147, at 346.
184. See Furby & Beyth-Marom, supra note 136, at 47-51; see also Valerie F.
Reyna et al., Attitude Change in Adults and Adolescents: Moderation Versus
Polarization, Statistics Versus Case Histories (1987) (unpublished manuscript),
cited in Furby & Beyth-Marom, supra note 136, at 18 (discussing study finding
greater tendency of adolescents than adults to be influenced by case examples).
A recent study compared children and young adults in their use of the represen-
tativeness heuristic (a commonly used strategy of relying on specific information
and similarities and ignoring base rates) and found that adolescents performed
more poorly than younger children. Janis E. Jacobs & Maria Potenza, The Use of
Judgment Heuristics to Make Social and Object Decisions: A Developmental Perspective, 62
CHILD DEV. 166, 175-76 (1991).
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edged. Although little empirical research has focused directly on
children's decisionmaking from a developmental perspective, 8 5
much data of inferential value exist. For example, the corpus of
research examining age patterns in compliance with medical
treatment I 6 seems to offer little that is useful to understanding
competence under the informed consent construct. Under a
more comprehensive framework, however, the findings seem
more relevant.' 8 7 The same is true of research examining how
the source of information diversely affects the value attached to it
by different groups of adolescents.' Studies that have docu-
mented change in cognitive and social development through the
course of childhood can be extended into adulthood, to clarify
more precisely the extent and context of developmental change
as it affects decisionmaking. Much developmental research com-
pares adolescents with younger children; less frequently is adoles-
cent functioning and decisionmaking compared to that of adults.
This body of knowledge can enhance understanding about
how various aspects of cognitive and social development affect
judgment, and it can clarify where empirical understanding is de-
ficient. I have described several features of adolescence that are
assumed to influence judgment. Although there is quite a lot of
indirect and anecdotal evidence, few studies have probed directly
the extent to which (or the way in which) body image, peer and
parent influence, time discounting and attitude toward risk distin-
guish adolescent and adult decisionmaking. Each of these fea-
tures might influence choice in complex ways. For example, the
influence of peers, parents and other authority figures could be
reflected in a correlation between the weight a decisionmaker at-
taches to information and the source of the information, or it
could be reflected in the subjective value attached to different
consequences. In either instance, differences between adults and
minors could be important, both in evaluating voluntariness in an
informed consent framework and in evaluating judgment.
Although our understanding of peer and parental influence can
be informed by turning to the social development literature, the
185. See Gardner et al., Developmental Change in Decision-Making, supra
note 95, at 1 (quotingJ. R. Rest, Moral Cognition, in COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT 565
(J. Flavell & E. Markman eds., 1983)).
186. For a discussion of studies supporting this point, see supra notes 134
and 159-61.
187. For an example of how treatment compliance literature might become
relevant under a more comprehensive framework when discussing the complexi-
ties of the policy implications, see infra notes 197-99 and accompanying text.
188. For examples of this type of research, see supra note 157.
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empirical picture of how decisionmaking in legal contexts might
be influenced is murky. 189 The challenge is daunting. In order to
think more scientifically and less intuitively about this and other
developmental influences, we need multiple studies with different
populations, in different contexts, making different kinds of deci-
sions. We are a long way from scientific knowledge about issues
that common intuition presumes are settled.
The effort to achieve a more comprehensive picture of the
way adolescents make choices also can enhance our understand-
ing of adolescent reasoning and capacity for understanding. As
William Gardner and his colleagues have demonstrated, knowl-
edge is relatively skeletal in this realm as well.' 90 The decision-
making model that I have employed to analyze judgment has been
the framework for traditional legal competence research. In its
reconceptualized form, this framework can serve to structure re-
search to encompass the varied dimensions of decisionmaking,
both those that have been obscured under the old framework and
those that were featured. In short, the problem with the informed
consent framework in shaping research was not in its use of a ra-
tional decisionmaking model to evaluate competence, but in its
emphasis on certain decisionmaking operations and exclusion of
others. Under the judgment framework, increased understanding
of judgment will enhance knowledge about other dimensions of
decisionmaking as well.
IV. THE JUDGMENT FRAMEWORK AND LEGAL POLICY
A. The Uses of Empirical Data
What difference will it make if advocates and social scientists
approach adolescent legal competence in the way that I have sug-
gested? In one sense, the implications for policy are straightfor-
ward. If presumptions about immature judgment, as well as
understanding and reasoning, influence the shape of policy that
regulates the lives of children, then a more comprehensive empir-
ical account of children's capacities will be both more useful and
more used than one which focuses narrowly. If the rationale for
189. See, e.g., Costanzo, supra note 131, at 369-72 (finding adolescents to be
more likely than younger or older decisionmakers to pick wrong option when
they believe peers have chosen that option); see also Scherer, supra note 84, at 434
(discussing systems theory and psychodynamic theory conceptualizations of au-
tonomy, which suggest adolescent responsiveness to peer influence). But see
Furby & Beyth-Marom, supra note 136, at 38-40 (describing research challeng-
ing view that adolescents are particularly susceptible to peer influence).
190. See Gardner et al., supra note 6, at 899-900.
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paternalism is weakened by the research, then paternalistic poli-
cies should be reconsidered. Although the lines that demarcate
legal adulthood are drawn to reflect the accommodation of sev-
eral interests, the age of majority is set at age eighteen in part
because eighteen year olds are presumed to be more mature than
sixteen year olds. If there is less difference than we supposed in
the broad range of capacities that together define maturity, then
the burden to justify restrictive protective policies on sixteen year
olds becomes greater. In this state of knowledge, the case might
be made for lowering the age of majority. A similar analysis ap-
plies to particular policies of restriction that are subject to chal-
lenge. If adolescents approach a given decision in a way that
approximates the manner that adults would approach the same
decision-in the sense that reasoning, understanding and judg-
ment are similar-then the restrictive policy, to be legitimate, re-
quires some justification besides incompetence.
A more comprehensive understanding of adolescent deci-
sionmaking permits a more tailored and precise response to
developmental difference. By this I do not mean that individual-
ized assessment is necessarily desirable. Rather, existing broad
policies of restriction and protection might become more respon-
sive to the particular exigencies of adolescence that currently are
only roughly perceived. For example, if adolescent decisionmak-
ing capability is more dependent than that of adults on having all
relevant information presented, then structuring legal decision-
making contexts to respond to this need might be desirable.' 9' In
areas in which adolescents demonstrate less able judgment, spe-
cific policies of protection might be indicated. Thomas Grisso's
recommendation of a per se exclusionary rule to be applied to all
minors in the juvenile waiver context is just such a protective re-
sponse to empirical evidence that adolescent judgment is wanting
191. For a discussion of why minors may be less capable of drawing on
their experience to independently identify options and consequences, see supra
notes 151-58 and accompanying text. Information is provided to them in the
context of health care decisions, and this model might be useful in other set-
tings. Less formal counselling is another method that could be used to commu-
nicate information. This is standard practice when adolescents contemplate
abortion. See Elizabeth S. Scott, Legal and Ethical Issues in Counseling Pregnant Ado-
lescents, in ADOLESCENT ABORTION: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES 116 (Gary
B. Melton ed., 1986). Effective communication of information is, of course, the
key, and this may require different procedures when dealing with minors. For
example, it has been suggested that Miranda rights should be explained to ado-
lescents in a more elaborate way than is the practice with adults. See Grisso,
supra note 53, at 1162 (discussing minors' comprehension of Miranda warnings).
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in this area.' 92 The deficiency in adolescent judgment is revealed
both in Grisso's research findings that minors under the age of
fifteen have poorer comprehension than adults and in the statisti-
cal evidence that even olderjuveniles make the (almost always un-
wise) decision to waive their right to remain silent more than
adults. ' 93
As these examples demonstrate, a more textured under-
standing of adolescent functioning as it relates to legal contexts is
worthwhile, not only because what we learn may reinforce or
challenge restrictive policies, but also because it might suggest
useful strategies to protect adolescent welfare. In some contexts,
evidence that adolescents make poorer choices than adults might
indicate paradoxically that greater self-determination is desirable.
For example, research data suggests that adolescents with chronic
illness are less compliant with medical treatment than adults (or
than younger children) with chronic illness. '94 If this response is
attributable, as most observers believe, to conflict around the de-
pendency associated with illness, then simply interpreting the evi-
dence as justification for restriction seems unhelpful. 9 5 The goal
in this situation, and perhaps in many treatment contexts, would
be to encourage a sense of responsibility through participation.
This goal might be furthered by a general requirement that ado-
lescents be informed and consulted on decisions affecting their
health. '9 6
192. For a discussion of Grisso's research and proposal for a per se rule, see
supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text. This characterization of the recom-
mendation is mine and not Grisso's.
193. Grisso, supra note 53, at 1134 n.3, 1160. If this were not so-that is, if
by age 15, minors had adult-like comprehension and waived their Miranda rights
at about the same rate as adults-then the case for a protective rule for 16 year
olds would be weakened. Under my framework, an interesting research inquiry
would focus on what influences minors to waive their Miranda rights in great
numbers, besides poorer comprehension, which only partly explains the
differences.
194. For a discussion of studies performed on this topic, see supra notes
133 & 159-61.
195. The external locus of control associated with chronic illness has many
debilitating effects, including low self-esteem. It is assumed that a greater sense
of personal control is associated with greater compliance. William Garrison &
Susan McQuiston, Chronic Illness During Childhood and Adolescence, 19 DEV.
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY 62 (1989). See generally Cromer & Tarnowski,
supra note 134, at 208-10.
196. Lois Weithorn has argued in favor of this approach, even for younger
children who are not "competent." Lois A. Weithorn, Involving Children in Deci-
sions Affecting their Welfare: Guidelines for Professionals, in CHILDREN'S COMPETENCE
TO CONSENT, supra note 45, at 235, 257 ("It is suggested that professionals who
work with children involve [them] ... in decisions regarding their own welfare to
the maximum extent possible .... ").
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It is clear that no simplistic formula defines the relationship
between adolescent decisionmaking capabilities and policies of
restriction, protection and self-determination. Adolescents may
be indistinguishable from adults in approaching a particular
choice, and yet extending legal authority may appear to carry too
high a cost in family disruption, with too little benefit to the mi-
nor. Other considerations could also be important. What is the
social cost of self-determination and of restriction? Who bears
the cost-the decisionmaker or others? Who is in the best posi-
tion to make the choice? Does the decisionmaker who has tradi-
tionally had authority have a conflict of interest which may
threaten the child's welfare? Can the decision be postponed until
adulthood? Policy choices will be driven by distinctive algorithms
based on contextual variables of which competence is only one
factor.
B. Normative Preferences and Empirical Uncertainty
Currently, scientific knowledge about adolescent decision-
making is scant and policy must be devised in a context of empiri-
cal uncertainty. 197 Under these circumstances, different accounts
of adolescence will be offered and underlying normative prefer-
ences will continue to drive the debate. Advocates resist common
perceptions about adolescent immaturity and dependency. From
their perspective, adolescents are legal persons and restrictive
legal treatment carries a significant burden of justification, in the
absence of strong empirical evidence of adolescent incapacity. 98
197. For a discussion of and proposal for judicial handling of empirical
questions in a context of empirical uncertainty, see John Monahan & Laurens
Walker, Empirical Questions Without Empirical Answers, 1991 Wisc. L. REV. 569.
198. Perhaps more accurately, advocates' positions can be put in three cate-
gories. Some advocates appear to hold that competence is irrelevant and that
minors should be accorded all legal rights of adults. See FARSON, supra note 2, at
27 ("The acceptance of the child's right of self-determination is fundamental to
all the rights to which children are entitled."); JOHN HOLT, ESCAPE FROM CHILD-
HOOD 224 (1974) (arguing that young minors should have right to "full and
equal protection of the law" and right to "choose to live as fully legally and
financially responsible citizen"). A second group of advocates hold that empiri-
cal evidence of competence should be the basis for expanded rights to self-de-
termination. This stance supports the argument that evidence of adolescent
competence under informed consent tests should result in legal authority to
make medical and other decisions. See APA Hodgson, Zbaraz and Thornburgh
briefs, supra note 3 (basing argument for right of adolescents to self-determina-
tion in abortion context on results of research); Gittler et al., supra note 5, at 24-
29; King, supra note 66 (arguing that age of majority for purpose of making
health care decisions should be lowered to age 12 or 13 with competence pre-
sumed until challenged and disproved); Gary B. Melton & AnitaJ. Pliner, Adoles-
cent Abortion: A Psycholegal Analysis, in ADOLESCENT ABORTION: PSYCHOLOGICAL
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In contrast, the paternalist version of adolescence emphasizes the
immaturity and vulnerability of this developmental stage. The
paternalistic perspective stresses the law's role in protecting chil-
dren and promoting their welfare. From this perspective, caution
about expanding adolescent rights is warranted, in part, because
freedom appears to carry substantial risks.
Many children's rights advocates support a presumption
favoring adolescent self-determination, arguing that the central
importance of autonomy and liberty in our legal framework re-
quires that these values not be casually subverted by broad pre-
sumptions of incompetence. 199 Paternalism is suspect in our
legal culture; we are generally loathe to subject one individual to
the decisionmaking authority of another on matters of private and
personal importance. Under this view, respect for the per-
sonhood of minors mandates that they be accorded authority as
legal actors unless they are demonstrably incapacitated. More-
over, further research is unnecessary to establish that adolescents,
at least in some respects, are closer in their capabilities to adults
than to younger minors, or that individuals within a given age
group vary greatly in their maturity and ability to perform differ-
ent functions. Thus, crude rules that restrict and protect minors
categorically and base access to legal privilege on age alone ig-
nore the wide range of capabilities within the category.
This stance can be translated into an argument that the law
should treat adolescents in the same way that it deals with adults
of uncertain competence. In an era in which the ideology of lib-
eral individualism defines the relationship between the individual
and the state, paternalistic legal regulation of adults with disabili-
ties has been attacked with considerable success. 200 Adults are
AND LEGAL ISSUES, supra note 191, at 1, 23 (noting that research on consent to
medical treatment and single available study on consent to abortion "give no
reason to doubt adolescents' competence to make decisions about continuation
of pregnancy"). A third position (which is actually a radical variant of the sec-
ond) is offered by Stephen Billick, who essentially argues that existing empirical
evidence establishes that 14 year olds are competent, and thus there is no longer
any reason to deny adolescents all rights and responsibilities. Billick, supra note
67, at 306-08. Many advocates who subscribe to the view that legal authority
should follow empirical evidence of competence also assert that the law should
reverse its traditional presumptions and presume competence in the absence of
evidence to the contrary. See, e.g., Stuart N. Hart, From Property to Person Status:
Historical Perspective on Children's Rights, 46 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 53, 57 (1991); Mel-
ton, supra note 3, at 102.
199. See Melton, supra note 3. This argument gains force when addressed
(as is often the case) to issues involving constitutional protection of autonomy
and liberty, such as abortion and psychiatric hospitalization.
200. This is perhaps most evident in changes in civil commitment law: over
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presumed to be competent legal actors capable of making their
own choices and of managing their lives. When an adult's compe-
tence to make a decision or perform a function is questioned, a
narrowly focused inquiry and determination assures that freedom
is not unduly restricted. A designation of general incompetence
is usually disfavored, even for persons with significant disabili-
ties. 20 1 If adolescents were subject to a similar approach, compe-
tence would seldom be challenged, and then only in the context
of a specific decision or task. The determination would be based
on individualized assessment.
The traditional legal approach to adolescent competence is,
of course, quite different. The law generally presumes that mi-
nors are incompetent and is only cautiously receptive to contrary
evidence. Moreover, even observers who are skeptical about the
traditional account of adolescent immaturity may have reserva-
tions about dismantling the paternalistic framework. In part,
these reservations reflect a concern that advocates have ignored
the undesirable trade-offs that may result if adolescents are ac-
corded adult-like legal status and have discounted the costs asso-
ciated with individualized assessment. Moreover, those who are
dubious about the wisdom of treating adolescents like adults ar-
gue that certain characteristics of childhood distinguish paternal-
ism directed at minors from paternalism that would have a more
onerous character.
In part, paternalists are wary of expanding adolescent rights
because such a course threatens to disrupt a policy scheme that by
and large is beneficial to minors. The special legal treatment of
children involves not only restricted freedom, but also special en-
the last two decades, involuntary commitment has been significantly restricted.
See RALPH REISNER & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH
SYSTEM: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL ASPECTS 596-604 (2d ed. 1990). Legal regulation
of the guardianship of mentally disabled persons has also been reformed in re-
cent years. Id. at 822-47.
201. See APPELBAUM ET AL., supra note 59, at 88-89 (noting two problems
with general incompetency designation: that there is "little correspondence be-
tween a determination of general incompetency and a patient's ability to partici-
pate in medical decisionmaking" and that test for designation can only be
applied "mechanically or subjectively"); SAMUEL JAN BRAKEL ET AL., THE MEN-
TALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 258-59 (3d ed. 1985); Meisel, supra note 113, at
449.
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titlements, 20 2 more limited obligations203 and reduced accounta-
bility and responsibility. 20 4 Although there is dissent, especially
in the realm of criminal responsibility,20 5 these latter dimensions
of policy toward minors are generally approved, even by advo-
cates. 20 6 In a crude way, the different facets of paternalistic policy
toward minors are all grounded in a presumption about immatur-
ity and thus are interdependent. Thus, if adolescents are ac-
corded adult-like freedom and privileges, many will question
whether special legal protection of children, predicated on imma-
202. For example, minors are entitled to financial support from parents and
to publicly funded education. In the event that parents are unable to provide
necessary financial support, the government extends Aid to Families with De-
pendent Children and Medicaid to provide for the child's basic needs. See Suss-
MAN, supra note 13, at 24-26.
203. Minors are of course not obligated to fulfill military service obliga-
tions. Id. at 49.
204. For example, minors can disaffirm most contracts. Id. at 48. Under
standard contract doctrine, only contracts for "necessaries" can be enforced
against minors. WALTER WADLINGTON ET AL., CHILDREN IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM 8-
9 (1983). In the realm of criminal responsibility, from the beginning of the juve-
nile court system, minors have received special treatment. The traditional juve-
nile court was premised on the notions that minors were not criminally
responsible and that rehabilitation was the purpose of intervention. Although
this premise has eroded in recent years, the policy of more lenient treatment
remains strong. See id. at 197-201 (tracing historical development of juvenile
courts and discussing legislative reforms ofjuvenile codes that provide for pro-
portionality in sanctions, determinate sentencing and increased role in decision-
making for juveniles); Barbara Danziger Flicker, Standards for Juvenile Justice: A
Summary &Analysis, 1982 INST. OFJuD. ADMIN. 22-27 (setting forth premise thatjuvenile sanction should be equal to crime but should also be least intrusive
disposition available); Gary B. Melton, Taking Gault Seriously: Toward A New Juve-
nile Court, 68 NEB. L. REV. 146, 151-53 (1989) (discussing relationship between
desirability ofjuvenile court and criminal responsibility ofjuvenile offenders).
205. Critics have long challenged the claim that the juvenile justice system
benefits youthful offenders. See Barry C. Feld,Juvenile Court Legislative Reform and
the Serious Youth Offender. Dismantling the Rehabilitative Ideal, 65 MINN. L. REV. 167
(1981); Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense: Punishment,
Treatment, and the Difference it Makes, 68 B.U. L. REV. 821 (1988) (criticizing the
quality gap between juvenile and adult courts); Barry C. Feld, The Transformation
of the Juvenile Court, 75 MINN. L. REV. 691 (1991) (arguing for abolition ofjuve-
nile courts); Melton, supra note 204 (arguing for new juvenile court based upon
more procedural protections and recognition of adolescent responsibility).
206. It is not surprising that advocates accept this type of special treatment
toward minors, given that there is, as I have argued, a paternalistic subtext to the
advocates' cause. For a discussion of this point, see supra notes 44-54 and ac-
companying text. It is uncontroversial that some aspects of the paternalistic
framework offer tangible benefits to children and also further society's goal of
producing educated and productive adults. Under traditional common law, the
age of majority was 18 for women and 21 for men. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 1-
13.42 (1950). No one believes that this was due to women's superior legal sta-
tus. Rather, the perceived greater importance of preparing boys for adulthood
justified continued dependency and parental responsibility.
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turity and vulnerability, is warranted.20 7 To be sure, no theoreti-
cal incoherence defeats a policy of extending adult-like freedom
to adolescents, while at the same time offering them special pro-
tection, entitlements and reduced responsibility. 208 At some
point, however, such an approach seems dissonant.20 9 Expanded
liberty may seem to undermine, at least politically, the justifica-
tion for benefits that children enjoy as a part of their special
status.210
Legal policy premised on the presumption that adolescent
self-determination should be maximized can be costly in another
way. The argument favoring bright line rules over individualized
assessment of competence is based partly on cost considerations
and partly on skepticism about the accuracy of individualized as-
207. In the same spirit, if minors are mature enough to be called upon to
fulfill the same responsibilities as adults, the case for adult-like privileges be-
comes stronger. For example, there is little doubt that discomfort over the dis-
enfranchised status of 18-year-old Viet Nam War draftees was a critical catalyst
to the passage of the Twenty-sixth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion. And yet, fighting and voting are quite unrelated functions.
208. Certainly, advocates have argued that adolescents be accorded self-
determination while at the same time retaining privileges and entitlements. See
Billick, supra note 67 (arguing that adolescents should be accorded legal rights
of adults but that parental responsibility should be retained); Michael Roche,
Childhood and its Environment: The Implications for Children's Rights, 34 Loy. L. REV. 5
(1988) (arguing that age of majority should be 15 for liberty, 21 for entitlement
and responsibility).
209. Lawrence Houlgate has described this dissonance in powerful terms.
See LAWRENCE HOULGATE, THE CHILD AND THE STATE 3 (1980). In Houlgate's
view, advocates argue on the one hand that children should have all legal rights
because they are as competent as adults. Id. On the other hand, according to
Houlgate, advocates argue for special rights of protection for children on the
ground that they are not competent. Id. "One is left wondering how these two
positions can be seriously advanced by a single author." Id.
210. The delicate balance can be demonstrated by examining the effect of
expanded self-determination rights for adolescents on family stability. A policy
according adolescents substantial legal autonomy represents a substantial, if in-
direct, intrusion into the family, a result that may indirectly damage the interests
of minors. Currently, parents' obligation to care for and support children is
accompanied by the legal authority to guide their development. If children be-
come autonomous, rights-bearing persons, parental enthusiasm for their duties
may be prematurely diluted. In an era when children's dependence on their
parents is extended into adulthood, this course seems to pose a risk. There is
good reason for such extended dependency, although it is not uncontroversial.
Society benefits if children have the training and education to prepare them for
our complex technological society. Parental financial support is a critical com-
ponent in obtaining education for most youths. See Michael S. Wald, Children's
Rights: A Framework For Analysis, 12 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 255, 275-277 (1979) (ana-
lyzing arguments that expanded children's rights threaten family stability and
reduce parents' incentive to fulfill their responsibilities); see also Childers v.
Childers, 575 P.2d 201 (Wash. 1978) (en banc) (authorizing child support to pay
for college education though child no longer a minor).
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sessment. The process of determining which minors are capable
of making a particular decision and which are not would be sub-
stantial and might seem justified only when the deprivation itself
is costly. 211 Moreover, some skeptics worry that assessment of
adolescent competence is likely to be distorted by the political
and ideological perspective of the decisionmaker. The experi-
ence with judicial assessment of maturity in the abortion context
suggests the pitfalls, with judges either rubber-stamping the mi-
nor's preference 212 or interjecting their own values and biases. 213
Thus, although bright line rules concededly will result in error in
individual cases, with fully capable minors subject to restriction, it
is not clear that individualized inquiries will greatly enhance
accuracy.214
Implicit in this analysis is the conclusion that paternalists are
willing to tolerate legal restriction of some competent minors
through efficiency-based classifications that would be unaccept-
able if applied to adults. In part, this response reflects the convic-
tion that restrictions on adolescent autonomy are intrinsically less
offensive than would be analogous burdens on adult liberty.
First, minority is a temporary condition, which results in post-
ponement rather than denial of rights and privileges. 21 5 To be
sure, on some issues, such as abortion, postponement can impose
the same costs as denial. On others, however, such as voting or
driving, the costs of postponement to the competent minor are
far less serious. A presumption that minors are incompetent
might also be less offensive because its effect is more frustrating
211. For example, postponing the right to vote is a minimal deprivation;
thus, a costly "competence" assessment procedure does not seem warranted.
On the other hand, abortion decisions are critically important and cannot be
postponed, and therefore, greater assessment costs might be justified. How-
ever, as the text suggests, analyzing abortion in a conventional competence
framework is unsatisfactory in many regards. For further discussion on this is-
sue, see infra note 214.
212. See Mnookin, supra note 124, at 240.
213. For a discussion of when judges impose their values on minors, see
supra note 124 and accompanying text.
214. If, in a given context, an age-based rule restricting autonomy imposes
a significant burden, a response of removing the age barrier may be preferable
to individualized determinations of competence. Thus, adolescents who express
a preference to obtain an abortion could be presumed competent. If a physician
were concerned that a particular patient failed to understand the procedure,
then a guardian could be appointed, as would happen with an adult in this
situation.
215. For a discussion of "weak" (and therefore less offensive) paternalism
in the context of regulation of creditor-debtor relations, see Robert E. Scott,
Rethinking the Regulation of Coercive Creditor Remedies, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 730
(1989).
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than stigmatic. An adult who is designated as legally incompetent
is singled out as different from and inferior to other adults. An
adolescent so described is part of a large cohort of peers whose
only disability is youth, a condition from which they will re-
cover.2 16 Thus, in an important sense, the pervasive paternalism
toward youth is a weak form of paternalism that seems to persist
without extreme discord within a broader liberal framework.
Although advocates and paternalists seem far apart in their
accounts of adolescence and of optimal legal policy, the two per-
spectives may share more common ground than is apparent. Ad-
vocates argue in general that autonomy promotes adolescent
welfare; 21 7 they seldom advance particular policies about which
that claim cannot be made. Similarly, in contexts in which self-
determination appears beneficial to minors, nothing in the pater-
nalistic framework argues against policies based on this premise.
What primarily separates advocates and paternalists are different
empirical accounts of adolescent capacity. The former account is
at least partly grounded in science, but is based on a constricted
conception of competence; the latter is shaped by "the pages of
human experience"21 8 and intuition. The challenge is to deepen
and broaden empirical understanding and to replace intuition
with insight.
216. This also distinguishes restrictions of adolescent liberty from burdens
on the autonomy interest of elderly persons.
217. See Tremper & Kelly, supra note 45. For a discussion of how autonomy
promotes adolescent welfare, see supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
218. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979). In Parham, Justice Burger
suggested that the "pages of human experience" indicate that parents generally
act in their children's best interest and that they possess what children lack in
maturity, experience and capacity for judgment. See id. at 602-03.
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